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GOVERNMENT ACTIVISM IN BANKRUPTCY 
Jared A. Ellias* 
George Triantis** 
ABSTRACT 
It is widely recognized that bankruptcy law can stymie regulatory 
enforcement and present challenges for governments when regulated businesses 
file for Chapter 11. It is less-widely understood that bankruptcy law can present 
governments with opportunities to advance policy goals if they are willing to 
adopt tactics traditionally associated with activist investors, a strategy we call 
“government bankruptcy activism.” The bankruptcy filings by Chrysler and 
General Motors in 2009 are a famous example: the government of the United 
States used the bankruptcy process to help both auto manufacturers resolve their 
financial distress while promoting the policy objectives of protecting union 
workers and addressing climate change. A decade later, the government of 
California applied its bargaining power in the Pacific Gas & Electric 
Company’s Chapter 11 case to protect climate policies and the victims of 
wildfires. These examples illustrate that, by tapping into the bankruptcy system, 
governments gain access to the exceptional powers that a debtor enjoys under 
bankruptcy law, which can complement the traditional tools of appropriations 
and regulation to facilitate and accelerate policy outcomes. This strategy is 
especially useful in times of urgency and policy paralysis, when government 
bankruptcy activism can provide a pathway past veto players in the political 
system. However, making policy through the bankruptcy system presents 
potential downsides as well, as it may also allow governments to evade 
democratic accountability and obscure the financial losses that stakeholders are 
forced to absorb to help fund those policy outcomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, governments––federal, state, and local––engage in an 
unending dance with businesses. Governments aim to implement policy goals 
and shape corporate conduct through legislation and regulation, and they give 
their dictates teeth by enforcing rules with the threat of criminal and civil 
liability. Governments also promote policy goals by spending, including through 
procurement, subsidies, and tax policy. For their part, business entities lobby 
against adverse proposed regulation and maneuver to avoid the costs of enacted 
mandates.1 Businesses can also take refuge from governments in federal 
bankruptcy courts, where they are shielded temporarily by bankruptcy law’s 
automatic stay of regulatory enforcement. But bankruptcy law offers more than 
a temporary refuge: businesses can unravel regulatory schemes that depend on 
deterrence by seeking to discharge fines for past violations2 and can reorganize 
their business in ways that thwart regulatory designs.3 In response, many 
governmental agencies contest the ability of bankruptcy judges to stay their 
enforcement efforts or issue orders, but they are often unsuccessful. 
In this Article, we argue that the bankruptcy system offers more than 
challenges to regulatory authority: it presents opportunities for governments to 
advance policy agendas that go beyond what a government can achieve outside 
of bankruptcy. The basic thrust of our argument is that governments can engage 
in what we refer to “government bankruptcy activism,” where they seek to 
influence the outcome of the restructuring process to promote their policy goals. 
It is well-established that activist investors like hedge funds can gain influence 
over Chapter 11 firms, chiefly by providing the debtors with post-petition 
financing conditioned on advancing the investors’ goals or by litigating to 
acquire favorable judicial orders and negotiating settlements in the shadow of 
 
 1 See Tarek A. Hassan et al., Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects, 134 Q. J. OF ECON. 
2135, 2136 (2019). 
 2 For a recent example, La Paloma Generating Station was discharged of cap-and-trade allowance 
surrender liabilities and subsequent response by CARB (the state covered the allowances out of a reserve pool). 
See Ken W. Irvin & David E. Kronenberg, Acquiring Bankrupt Energy Assets Clear of Compliance Obligations, 
POWER MAG. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.powermag.com/white-papers/acquiring-bankrupt-energy-assets-
clear-of-compliance-obligations/. 
 3 National Rifle Association is a current notable attempt; it filed in Texas to avoid regulation by New 
York state. See Danny Hakim, N.R.A. Declares Bankruptcy and Seeks to Exit New York, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/15/us/politics/nra-bankruptcy.html. A prominent past example was 
by Pacific Gas & Electric Company to implement a “regulatory jailbreak” in its 2001 Chapter 11 case. See Press 
Release, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, PUC Files Opposition to PG&E Bankruptcy Reorganization Plan (Nov. 27, 
2011), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/News_release/11313.htm. 
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that litigation.4 Governments can adopt these hedge fund tactics and enjoy added 
leverage from their authority as regulators, such as when a firm’s continuation 
depends on regulatory reforms or permits that cannot be implemented by 
bankruptcy court order alone. In short, the bankruptcy of an important 
corporation can present governments with long-term opportunities that outweigh 
the short-term challenges of the bankruptcy stay and discharge.  
Through government bankruptcy activism, the bankruptcy system can be a 
force multiplier for government policymaking. By influencing a bankruptcy 
proceeding, a government can benefit from the same bankruptcy powers that 
otherwise bedevil regulatory enforcement—such as the powers to stay creditor 
enforcement, reject contracts, shed assets and modify obligations—and to do in 
a matter of weeks what could take years outside of bankruptcy. To be sure, the 
Bankruptcy Code contains safeguards against third party abuse of Chapter 11, 
but governments can harness the bankruptcy system to advance the interests of 
politically important groups and policies, as well as to impose on debtors 
governance structures and business plans that they would not have agreed to 
outside of bankruptcy, at least not without new regulation or public spending. 
This opportunity is particularly valuable when governments face log jams, 
vetoes, and policy gridlock in enacting the enabling legislation or regulation. 
Even with highly regulated firms, government agencies each have narrowly 
defined jurisdiction over parts of a firm’s activities. Bankruptcy law, on the other 
hand, assumes jurisdiction over the entire firm, giving governmental entities the 
ability to promote more comprehensive adjustments and to influence aspects of 
a firm’s business that otherwise might have been otherwise out of reach. 
Moreover, the bankruptcy system is populated by expert lawyers and financial 
advisors who may lack domain knowledge but have deep expertise in resolving 
disputes by trading off concessions across the debtor firm and forcing changes 
on reluctant stakeholders. 
We conclude by discussing ways in which this policymaking strategy in 
bankruptcy can be problematic. The accountability and transparency that are 
essential to a democratic system can sometimes be enhanced and at other time 
impaired in the bankruptcy system. For example, if the government intends to 
provide a company with an ad hoc bailout loan, doing so through the bankruptcy 
process could make the loan process more transparent than if the oversight was 
provided by a legislature or an administrative agency.  Bankruptcy law requires 
 
 4 Jared A. Ellias, The Law and Economics of Investing in Bankruptcy in the United States (Feb. 10, 
2020) (unpublished manuscript at 11–14), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3578170.  
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disclosure of the terms of the loan in the motion for judicial approval.5 But 
advancing, for example, climate policy through the bankruptcy system may 
result in less transparency than would be the case if the climate policy was 
enacted through normal legislative and regulatory pathways. By proceeding 
through bankruptcy activism, a partisan government may be able to enact 
policies that would have been blocked otherwise. Whether one sees this as a 
societal advantage––for overcoming gridlock––or an undesirable end-run 
around democratic processes, might well depend on one’s perspective on the 
policy in question. 
We begin in Part I by reviewing how governments usually play defense in 
Chapter 11. In Part II, we then describe the goals and methods of government 
activism in bankruptcy. Instead of resisting the incursion of bankruptcy on 
regulatory efforts, governments have begun to more aggressively harness the 
process to promote and amplify the execution of policy goals––in other words, 
to “play offense.” In Part III, we describe two prominent examples of 
government policy execution through the bankruptcy system. In Section IV.A, 
we highlight the Obama Administration’s 2009 decision to use the bankruptcy 
system to implement climate-change and worker-protection policies while 
financing the restructurings and recoveries of Chrysler and General Motors. We 
then discuss in Section IV.B California Governor Newsom’s activist strategy a 
decade later to use the 2020 bankruptcy of California’s giant utility, the Pacific 
Gas & Electric Company, to promote the State’s ongoing shift to clean energy, 
as well as its interests in promoting the safe operation of its power grid and the 
compensation of wildfire victims. In both sets of cases, governments convened 
a group of bankruptcy and policy experts to implement strategies that allowed 
them to achieve policy “wins” in the bankruptcy forum. While the federal 
government combined the bankruptcy process with executive action to provide 
Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP) funding to Chrysler and GM, Governor 
Newsom used litigation in the bankruptcy process in tandem with both 
regulatory and legislative action. 
Finally, in Part IV, we briefly outline the democratic, political, and economic 
concerns raised by governmental bankruptcy activism. Commentators, as well 
as creditors who objected to the bankruptcy resolution in Chrysler and GM, have 
argued that the Obama Administration abused the bankruptcy process for 
partisan purposes, in order to aid its political ally, the United Auto Workers. We 
set aside the question of whether the executive’s use of TARP funds in 
bankruptcy for these purposes was consistent with the enabling legislation and 
 
 5 E.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001(c)(1). 
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ask instead whether it was consistent with bankruptcy policy. In the past few 
months, members of Congress have criticized the Department of Justice’s 
settlement with Purdue Pharma, now approved by the bankruptcy judge, for 
requiring that the company exit bankruptcy as a public benefit corporation. 
While the substance of the Purdue settlement has attracted much criticism, it is 
noteworthy for our purposes that, in a letter to the Attorney General, forty-six 
members of Congress stated that “[t]hese are questions of policy that must be 
resolved by Congress, not the courts.”6 Here again, we set aside the question of 
whether the settlement was a constitutionally valid use of the government’s 
enforcement power and focus on the appropriateness of the bankruptcy forum. 
Our Article may be thought of as an extension of the classic debate ignited 
by Elizabeth Warren and Douglas Baird in 1987 on the scope of bankruptcy 
policy.7 The question there was whether bankruptcy is an appropriate forum for 
redistribution and business rehabilitation to vindicate policies such as the 
protection of workers and communities from the dissolution of companies. 
Warren saw such policies at the core of bankruptcy’s purpose while Baird 
viewed it as being more appropriately addressed in non-bankruptcy (or “state”) 
law. Their respective views of the discretion of the judge were accordingly 
different, with Warren urging bankruptcy courts to embrace their equitable 
jurisdiction to promote such policies. Our focus here is not on the merits of 
distributive policies implemented by bankruptcy courts, but rather activism by 
the executive branch in promoting an even wider range of policies, such as 
climate change, than the protection of vulnerable parties from the dissolution of 
the debtor business. We conclude briefly in Part VI. 
I. DEFENSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION IN BANKRUPTCY 
In this Part, we briefly review the major challenges that a bankruptcy filing 
presents to governmental regulatory capacity. Bankruptcy law undermines 
 
 6 Letter from Katherine Clark, Member of Congress, et al., to Hon. William Bar, U.S. Att’y Gen. 
(Nov. 10, 2020) (available at https://katherineclark.house.gov/_cache/files/2/d/2dcd9718-3c10-4b98-ad40-
782844eff102/1EF22593BD913787CB832BF8A3339A47.11.10.20-letter-to-ag-barr-on-sweetheart-provision-
in-purdue-settlement-final.pdf).  
 7 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987); Douglas G. Baird, Loss 
Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987) [hereinafter 
Baird, Forum Shopping]. Later scholarship developing these two positions include: Donald R. Korobkin, 
Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 719–20 (1997); KAREN GROSS, 
FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 1424 (Yale Uni. Press, 1996); Elizabeth 
Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Searching for Reorganization Realities, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1257, 1265–86 (1994); 
Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 103 YALE L.J. 573 (1998) [hereinafter Baird, Uncontested 
Axioms]. 
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systems of regulation with three tools: (1) the automatic stay on enforcement 
actions; (2) the prohibition on discriminating against insolvent or bankrupt 
debtors in some forms of regulatory enforcement; and (3) the discharge of claims 
after confirmation of a reorganization plan. 
First, the automatic stay under Code section 362(a) stops judicial, 
administrative, or any other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or 
could have been initiated before the bankruptcy filing, and the enforcement of 
any judgment or the collection of any claim against the debtor. Congress 
anticipated the problem this would pose for regulators and created the so-called 
“police power” exception, that allows a government to “enforce such 
governmental unit’s police and regulatory power, including the enforcement of 
a judgment other than a money judgment . . . .”8 Case law interpreting this 
exception makes clear that a regulatory agency cannot enforce or collect a 
penalty or fine arising from the debtor’s actions before bankruptcy.9 However, 
some courts have allowed agencies to continue litigation to liquidate such a 
claim with the goal of preserving the deterrence objective of the regulation (even 
if the enforcement of the judgment is stayed).10 Of course, regulators may 
otherwise move to have the automatic stay lifted, but showing the required cause 
for judicial relief is usually an uphill battle. 
Second, under Code section 525(a), a governmental unit may not revoke or 
deny a license to a debtor solely because the debtor is in bankruptcy, has been 
insolvent, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in bankruptcy. This shield 
has been interpreted expansively and allows regulated entities to enjoy broad 
protection from government threats to terminate licenses, which is often an 
important method of enforcing a broader regulatory scheme. For example, in 
2003, the Supreme Court applied this provision to prevent the Federal 
Communications Commission from revoking auctioned spectrum licenses on 
the grounds that the licensee had failed to pay the price of the licenses in full.11 
 
 8 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2019).  
 9 See, e.g., In re FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 945 F.3d 431, 446 (6th Cir. 2019) (preventing the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission from taking action related to contracts of the debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(b)(4)). 
 10 See, e.g., Memorandum and Order at 5, Solis v. SCA Restaurant Corp., 463 B.R. 248 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
2011) (No. 2:09-cv-02212) (stating that litigation falls within the police and regulatory power exception of 
section 364(b)(4) because, “should the DOL [Department of Labor] succeed in obtaining a money judgment 
against the defendant, such a judgment could deter unlawful behavior by others.”); United States v. Nicolet, 857 
F.2d 202, 210 (3d Cir. 1988) (“The recoupment mandate interjects a valuable deterrence element into the 
CERCLA scheme, ensuring that responsible parties will be held accountable for their environmental misdeeds. 
These considerations make it plain that the present action falls within the ‘related to police or regulatory powers’ 
category.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 11 See FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 296 (2003). 
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Third, a reorganizing debtor may avoid regulatory liability by confirming a 
reorganization plan that discharges the liability upon paying cents on the dollar. 
The government’s objection can be outvoted under bankruptcy’s class-voting 
process and the debtor has substantial leeway to gerrymander the classes to 
ensure that the government’s (typically unsecured claim) vote is defeated.12 As 
a result, government agencies sometimes seek to avoid discharge by arguing that 
their remedies are not “claims” under the Code. This argument too is an uphill 
battle if the regulatory violation occurred prior to the bankruptcy filing.13 
Given this framework of federal law, government agencies are often left to 
argue that they fall within one of the exceptions to bankruptcy powers prescribed 
by the Code (such as exemption from the stay or exclusion from the definition 
of “claim”). The exercise of discretion by bankruptcy judges under these 
exceptions effectively shape the boundaries between those regulatory actions 
that are subordinated to bankruptcy’s goals and those that are not. In general, 
bankruptcy judges allow government regulators to act narrowly under the 
exception for police and regulatory power to protect the most pressing public 
policies but push back on everything else. Bankruptcy judges, for example, 
allow regulators to enforce laws against racial discrimination,14 the False Claims 
Act’s protections against government fraud,15 and to protect the public from the 
distribution of adulterated drugs.16 But less pressing public policies that are more 
purely economic or financial in nature tend fall by the wayside, even if they are 
deeply important to a governmental entity. For example, the International Trade 
Commission has usually been unsuccessful in gaining exception from the stay 
by arguing the economic significance of protecting intellectual property rights.17 
 
 12 Chapter 11 guarantees the objecting claimant only the liquidation payout of its claim and, even if the 
government’s class dissents as a whole, it may have no ability to prevent the cramdown of the plan if the court 
finds it to be fair and equitable. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (b).  
 13 But cf. United States v. Apex Oil Co, Inc., 579 F.3d 734, 735–36 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
injunctive remedy of the Environmental Protection Agency was not a claim that could be discharged because 
the EPA did not have the right to sue for money damages under the governing Act). 
 14 See EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that subjective hiring 
practices discriminating women was not justified by business necessity); In re Mohawk Greenfield Motel Corp., 
239 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) (noting that if a state has, “a strongly felt public policy against 
discrimination,” then it can be, “protected by a legislative scheme.”). 
 15 See United States v. Vanguard Healthcare, LLC, 565 B.R. 627, 632 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2017) (holding 
that a suit “brought pursuant to the Federal False Claims Act is sufficient to satisfy the section 362(b)(4) 
exception.”) (quoting In re Commonwealth Companies, Inc., 913 F.2d 518, 526 (8th Cir. 1990)).  
 16 In re Cantrell Drug Co., 585 B.R. 555, 587 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2018) (holding that, “the Court declines 
to scrutinize the FDA’s legal authority” to bring regarding adulterated drugs). 
 17 See, e.g., In re Qimonda AG, 425 B.R. 256, 263 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010), rev’d sub nom. U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n v. Jaffe, 433 B.R. 538 (E.D. Va. 2010); see also In re Spansion, Inc., 418 B.R. 84, 95 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2009) (holding that “ITC [was] not exercising police and regulatory power,” and, “therefore, the action 
[was] not exempted from the automatic stay.”). 
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The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission tries to protect its jurisdiction by 
arguing that bankruptcy courts cannot void pre-bankruptcy energy purchase 
contracts without their express permission, and these arguments also usually 
fail.18 Finally, coal companies frequently use bankruptcy to avoid environmental 
liabilities despite objections by government regulators tasked with 
enforcement.19 In the constant tug of war between bankruptcy law and 
governments, it is fair to say that governments often lose, undermining the 
execution of their regulatory objectives. 
II. GOALS AND METHODS OF GOVERNMENT BANKRUPTCY ACTIVISM 
In this Part, we discuss how governments can utilize the financial distress 
and bankruptcy of a business to accomplish policy objectives. While the 
traditional government posture is to try to defend its regulatory authority by 
“opting out” of bankruptcy stay and discharge, there are also ways in which 
government actors can further important policy goals by playing a larger role in 
shaping the outcome of the bankruptcy case. Two sets of factors combine to give 
government extra policy leverage in bankruptcy. The first is the financial distress 
of the debtor’s business. The debtor’s insolvency leaves it vulnerable to 
influence by new liquidity providers who either provide fresh financing or 
relieve some of the overhang of existing liabilities. All levels of government can 
and do provide relief through loans or procurement contracts and, in either case, 
can condition their contribution to promote policy objectives. These instruments 
are well known and have been studied. The motivating question for this Article 
is how the bankruptcy process amplifies the government’s impact through these 
instruments. In the Chrysler and GM case (Part IV.A), the government executed 
 
 18 See, e.g., In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471, 486 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019) (rejecting an attempt by FERC 
to preempt the bankruptcy judge’s powers to void contracts); In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 519–24 (B.A.P. 
5th Cir. 2004); In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 30 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 
945 F.3d 431, 446 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 19 See, e.g., United States’, States’, and Tribe’s Objection to the Plan at 1, In re Peabody Energy Corp., 
579 B.R. 208 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2017) (No. 16-42529-399) (EPA and DOI called Peabody’s reorganization plan 
“obviously a carefully constructed scheme to evade environmental liabilities through discriminatory 
classifications and treatments of environmental general unsecured creditors as opposed to other general 
unsecured creditors.”); Reservation of Rights of United States of America in Response to Motion of the Debtors, 
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019, for Entry of Stipulation & Order Concerning Reclamation Bonding of Their 
Surface Coal Mining Operations in Wyoming at 4, In re Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 552 B.R. 314 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
2015) (No. 15-33896) (EPA and DOI objected that Alpha Natural Resources’ reorganization would “render[] it 
unable to comply with significant environmental compliance obligations under federal and state law for the 
mines it will continue to own.”); see generally Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy As Bailout: Coal 
Company Insolvency and the Erosion of Federal Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 879, 885 (2019) (arguing that “coal 
companies have used the Bankruptcy Code to evade congressionally imposed liabilities requiring that they pay 
lifetime health benefits to coal miners and restore land degraded by surface mining.”). 
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policy goals through the rescue financing combined with the structure of the 
bankruptcy sale under section 363(b) of the Code. In the Pacific Gas & Electric 
Company (PG&E) case, government’s primary tool was the fund established 
under California Assembly Bill 1054 to pay the costs of wildfire damages caused 
by equipment of public utility companies.20 
The second set of levers are features of bankruptcy law. Specifically, 
bankruptcy gives the debtor a range of powers that it would not have outside of 
bankruptcy. Activist investors have been known to exert control over those 
powers to enrich themselves.21 Similarly, government actors can influence the 
debtor’s use of these powers to advance policy goals. Indeed, as we discuss in 
Part V, they may do so to advance political goals of the party in government. 
Perhaps the most significant of the bankruptcy features in this respect is debtor-
in-possession (DIP) financing. This is a favored tool of activism among investors 
because the terms and conditions of such financing give the lender control over 
aspects of the bankruptcy case. While activists can also acquire bargaining 
power by litigating motions and objections, the most direct route to control of a 
Chapter 11 case comes through providing the company with needed financing. 
Under Code section 364, the court may authorize the debtor to borrow and 
give the new lender priority over unsecured creditors and also over a secured 
creditor if that creditor’s interest is adequately protected.22 These loans, which 
are referred to as debtor-in-possession loans or “DIP loans,” have become a very 
common and significant feature of bankruptcy reorganization.  The debtor’s 
ability to give a new lender a higher priority than prebankruptcy creditors is one 
of the principal attractions of a bankruptcy filing. By attaching conditions to the 
 
 20 See infra Part IV.B.  
 21 See, e.g., Ellias, supra note 4, at 11–17 (discussing how activist investors utilize contracting, litigation, 
and other methods for improving the value of their claims); see Jared A. Ellias, Do Activist Investors Constrain 
Managerial Moral Hazard in Chapter 11?: Evidence from Junior Activist Investing, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 493, 
534–35 (2016); Edward I. Altman, The Role of Distressed Debt Markets, Hedge Funds and Recent Trends in 
Bankruptcy on the Outcomes of Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 75, 75 (2014); 
Michelle M. Harner et al., Activist Investors, Distressed Companies, and Value Uncertainty, 22 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 167, 175–185 (2014); Wei Jiang, Kai Li & Wei Wang, Hedge Funds and Chapter 11, 67 J. FIN. 
513, 556 (2012). 
 22 George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. Rev. 
901, 920 (1993) (explaining how DIP financing addresses dual problems of debt overhang and overinvestment); 
George Triantis, Financial Slack and the Laws of Secured Transactions, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2000) 
(explaining how bankruptcy law addresses liquidity needs of distressed firms and promotes optimal liquidity or 
financial slack); accord Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1557 (2013). After examining all the large bankruptcies between 1988–2008, it has been found that 
around 44% of firms borrowed to fund the bankruptcy, with these firms borrowing more than $5.5 billion in 
capital. See B. Espen Eckbo, Kai Li & Wei Wang, Rent Extraction by Super-Priority Lenders 9, 16 (Tuck Sch. 
of Bus. Working Paper, No. 3384389, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3384389. 
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DIP loan. often in the form of covenants and events of default, activist investors 
can gain enormous influence over the bankruptcy process and shape its 
outcome.23 For example, a DIP loan may have a provision that forces the Chapter 
11 firm to implement a transaction that protects the DIP lenders’ interests, such 
as a speedy auction or a restructuring plan that ensures favorable treatment of 
the DIP lenders’ claims.24 
Through the leverage obtained in a financing contract, a government can 
influence the debtor’s decision to exercise several important powers in 
bankruptcy, including: (1) to assume or reject executory contracts and leases; 
(2) to sell some or all of its assets;25 and (3) to restructure its liabilities through 
majority class voting or judicial cramdown. While an investor activist would be 
exerting its control over the debtor to maximize its financial return, government 
would do so to pursue policy (or political) goals. So, for example, a government 
might pressure the debtor to assume a contract it would otherwise reject or keep 
assets that the debtor would otherwise sell, to maximize the return to other 
creditors. We briefly outline these powers here and how a government with 
influence might advance policy through them. 
Code section 365 allows the debtor to assume or reject executory contracts 
and leases.26 Of course, contracting parties are free even outside bankruptcy to 
avoid their promised performance: the remedy for breach outside of bankruptcy 
is typically the payment of expectation damages. But the judgment creditor of 
an insolvent debtor gets cents on the dollar even outside of bankruptcy. So, how 
does the right to reject in bankruptcy improve the position of the debtor outside 
bankruptcy? Arguably, the right to reject in bankruptcy legitimizes the breach 
of the contract because it is viewed as being in the interest of the overall welfare 
of the debtor’s stakeholders. The debtor may use the threat of rejection to force 
a renegotiation of some of its contracts with a particular blend of advantages: it 
can threaten reducing the counterparty’s right to an unsecured claim while also 
assuring that its obligation under a renegotiated contract is likely to be fully 
 
 23 See, e.g., AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11: 2012-2014 FINAL 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 80–81 (2014) (“The Commissioners discussed at length the potential impact 
of terms in a postpetition credit agreement that dictate or attempt to influence the course of the chapter 11 case, 
or that implement waivers of, or otherwise affect, rights under the Bankruptcy Code.”); see GEORGE TRIANTIS, 
DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION FINANCING (B. Adler ed., Edward Elgar Pub., 2019). 
 24 Kenneth Ayotte & Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Process for Sale, 39 YALE J. ON REGUL. (forthcoming 
2021) (manuscript at 58) (on file with authors) (demonstrating how lenders benefit from making DIP loans). 
 25 The debtor can also propose, for authorization by the court, the method of sale. This was an important 
power in the Chrysler sale. See Peter Valdes-Dapena, Chrysler Closing 789 Dealerships, CNN MONEY (May 
14, 2009, 10:39 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2009/05/14/autos/chrysler_dealer_closings/index.htm.  
 26 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2019). 
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performed. The Code also provides the debtor with the right to assume contracts, 
effectively by curing and compensating for the breach, and it need not worry 
about existing breaches of solvency or other financial conditions. So, the debtor 
has the enhanced option in bankruptcy to accept beneficial and reject (or 
renegotiate) unprofitable contracts and leases. 
The right to reject long-term contracts such as distributorships, franchises, 
and leases are particularly important and their treatment in bankruptcy is 
significantly different from outside bankruptcy.27 Some courts have authorized 
franchisees to reject their agreements and continue to operate free of covenants 
not to compete (other than an unsecured damages claim). Franchisors or 
manufacturers can shed underperforming or redundant dealerships (as Chrysler 
did) notwithstanding restrictions in distributorship agreements, federal or state 
statutes28 and the political hurdles that would impede such termination outside 
bankruptcy.29 
Bankruptcy can also be used to exit or renegotiate union contracts, although 
the Code provides unionized workers with more protection than other 
contractual counterparties to block Chapter 11 firms from forcing concessions 
on them.30 The debtor must satisfy the burden of proving that rejection of the 
contract is necessary for reorganization, bargaining in good faith, providing fair 
and equitable treatment, and giving complete information necessary for the court 
to evaluate the debtor’s modified proposal. For example, Northwest Airlines 
filed for bankruptcy in 2005 because of spikes in jet fuel prices and the 
competition from rivals with lower labor costs. Northwest was able to force its 
 
 27 See generally Kenneth Ayotte, Leases and Executory Contracts in Chapter 11, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 637, 637 (2015) (noting that Chapter 11 “allows debtors to choose whether to keep [], abandon [], or 
transfer [] their contracts”). 
 28 State statutes often require notice and/or cause before termination, cancellation, or non-renewal. See, 
e.g., Michigan Vehicle Franchise Act § 7, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 445.1567 (LexisNexis 2019) (“a 
manufacturer or distributor shall not cancel, termination, fail to renew, or refuse to continue any dealer agreement 
. . . .”). 
 29 Valdes-Dapena, supra note 25; see In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 212–13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 30 11 U.S.C. § 1113. See, e.g., In re Patriot Coal Corporation, 493 B.R. 65, 139–40 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 
2013) (rejecting coal miner union contracts); In re Chicago Const. Specialties, Inc., 510 B.R. 205, 224 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2014) (terminating construction and general laborer’s pension and welfare funds); In re N.W. Holding 
Co., 533 B.R. 753, 765 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2015) (tearing up union contracts and ceasing the funding of retired 
machinist’s benefits); In re Bowen Enter., Inc., 196 B.R. 734, 747 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (destroying 
supermarket union workers union contracts). 
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flight attendants to take $195 million in pay reductions after the bankruptcy 
judge permitted Northwest to reject their collective bargaining agreement.31 
One can speculate about the government’s policy interest in a debtor’s 
decision to assume or reject contracts. Environmental policy may dictate that a 
debtor should reject fossil fuel supply contracts or assume even unprofitable 
ones for the supply of clean alternative energy. Similarly, concern with the 
economic health of a depressed community may indicate that franchises or 
distributorships should not reject contracts with local workers. And, of course, 
there is a distinctive policy perspective on the renegotiation or rejection of union 
contracts, which we will turn to in the Chrysler case study. What these foci of 
government influence have in common is that the financial cost, if any, of 
pursuing such policy goals is borne by another claimholder in bankruptcy. 
Arguably, this is an unlegislated tax or unfunded mandate, implemented in the 
bankruptcy reorganization plan and imposed on one or more classes of other 
creditors. 
Although business entities may sell assets outside of bankruptcy, the 
bankruptcy process facilitates sales by allowing assets to be sold free and clear 
of third-party interests, particularly unencumbered by security interests and 
successor liability.32 Companies commonly also use bankruptcy to shed 
underperforming assets and refocus on their core business.33 Government 
control (again, like the influence of activist investors) can be applied in two 
ways. First, the government can influence whether and what assets are sold. In 
a similar respect to the decision to assume, reject or modify contracts, the 
government may promote the retention or disposal of assets that promotepolicy 
goals. Second, the government can use its leverage to influence how assets are 
sold. In Chrysler, the government required that some liabilities must be assumed 
 
 31 Section 1113 requires negotiations in good faith, and the bankruptcy judge found that the flight 
attendants, who had previously rejected the pay cuts, had done so without good cause and that the pay cuts were 
necessary to reorganize. See In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 307, 331–32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). In 
contrast, in the American Airlines 2012 bankruptcy proceedings, the airline sought to annually lower costs by 
modifying their collective bargaining agreement. See In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 284, 398–99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2012). However, the bankruptcy judge denied American Airlines’ proposal to cut annual costs of $370 million 
by rejecting its CBA with its union pilots because the airline failed to show its plan was justified by its reference 
to the Business Plan or the practices of their competitors. Id. at 454. Compare id., with In re Pinnacle Airlines 
Corp., 483 B.R. 381, 424 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying the debtor’s rejections because the pilot union had 
good cause for declining to accept the overreaching proposed modifications). 
 32 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f).  
 33 In a recent example, Sears sold 235 properties with unprofitable stores in bankruptcy. See Lauren 
Zumbach, To Avoid Bankruptcy, Sears CEO Proposes Selling off Real Estate. The Retailer Has Tried That Move 
Before, CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 28, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-sears-lampert-esl-
proposal-store-sales-0928-story.html. 
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by the purchaser, while the sale is free and clear of all others.34 This is a 
distinction with great distributional—and therefore potentially policy—impact 
because assumed liabilities are usually satisfied in full. 
Finally, bankruptcy law provides debtors with the means to restructure and 
discharge their prebankruptcy liabilities without the consent of their affected 
creditors: notably, the majority voting rule within any given class of claimants35 
and the cramdown option when a court finds that a proposed plan is “fair and 
equitable.”36 While under the best interests test each creditor is guaranteed the 
payout it would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation,37 the debtor has 
significant discretion in distributing the going concern surplus among its 
creditors. Government activism can prefer policy-favored claimants at the 
expense of the others, if the dissenters can be outvoted or if the court finds that 
the reorganization is fair and equitable.  Many restrictions in the Code, such as 
the best interest or cramdown tests, rely on asset valuations and the typically 
broad range of plausible valuation methods and parameters give the debtor and 
hence its influencers, like the government, a significant amount of leeway. 
Moreover, in some situations, creditors have the valuable right to seek 
adjudication of tort claims by juries, and bankruptcy law may allow the debtor 
to force estimation of the claim by a bankruptcy judge instead.38 Particularly 
given that bankruptcy judges have in mind the impact of estimations on the 
recovery of other claimholders and on the survival of the going concern, this can 
lead to lower claim amounts for tort creditors than outside bankruptcy. 
III. GOVERNMENT ACTIVISM IN CHRYSLER AND PG&E 
In this Part, we present two case studies that illustrate how a government can 
“play offense” when a business entity files a bankruptcy petition and emerge 
from the chaos of a Chapter 11 filing with policy wins. As the cases show, the 
tools of bankruptcy law and the bargaining power created by financial distress 
can combine to allow the government to obtain results that would have been 
harder to achieve in the same time frame outside of bankruptcy. We present two 
case studies here and, before turning to them, highlight some of the contrasts 
between them. First, while each company filed for bankruptcy because of 
 
 34 Infra Section III.A.2. 
 35 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(8), 1126(c). 
 36 Id. § 1129(b). 
 37 Id. § 1129(a)(7). 
 38 Michael Liedtke, PG&E Could Avoid Jury Trial if $13.5 Billion Settlement Gets OK From Governor, 
Judge, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/11790379/pge-could-avoid-jury-trial-if-
13-5-settlement-approved. 
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financial distress, the federal government had firm control of the GM and 
Chrysler bankruptcy filings on the petition date while California’s government 
would only take control of the PG&E bankruptcy later in the bankruptcy process. 
Second, Chrysler and GM were formally bankruptcy sales under section 363, 
while PG&E exited after confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. These differences 
meant that the government used somewhat different tools in each of them to 
achieve desired outcomes. 
A. Chrysler 
The Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies in 2009 were unprecedented 
in terms of size, speed, public focus, and degree of government intervention. As 
a major intervenor in these auto bankruptcies, the Obama Administration was 
able to further its general economic policy objective of ensuring that the 
manufacturers survived the financial crisis, along with their workers and 
communities.39 The government was also able to leverage powers available only 
in bankruptcy to achieve other political wins outside of, and arguably at odds 
with the bankruptcy goal of maximizing the return to claimholders. Our 
description will focus on Chrysler, but the approach was very similar in GM. 
1. Chrysler’s Distress and Bankruptcy Proceeding 
In 2008, Chrysler and GM experienced severe financial distress—losses, 
illiquidity, and insolvency—that threatened their survival.40 Their financial 
distress was largely due to the cost-structure of auto manufacturing in the United 
States and intense product market competition.41 The companies previously had 
made expensive commitments to labor for wages and benefits, as well as other 
concessions in elaborate work rules such as job classifications. The companies 
also sold their vehicles through costly and inefficient dealership networks. As a 
result of these burdens, the rise in gas prices and the shift of consumer demand 
to smaller cars, American car companies could not compete against foreign 
(particularly Japanese) manufacturers. The drying up of consumer credit and the 
general drop in demand for automobiles during the 2007 to 2009 great recession 
accelerated their decline. By the fall of 2008, both companies were incurring 
 
 39 Jeffery McCracken, John D. Stoll & Neil King Jr., U.S. Threatens Bankruptcy for GM, Chrysler, WALL. 
ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2009, 12:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123845591244871499. 
 40 SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF 
THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY, CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL 7–8 (Sept. 9, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/ 
public/resources/documents/tarpautoreport.pdf [hereinafter Oversight Report]. 
 41 Id. at 7. 
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large quarterly losses and were burdened by enormous unfunded healthcare and 
retiree pension obligations.42 
Given the credit crunch in the recession, Chrysler and GM had no feasible 
source of new funding and Congress denied their request in the fall of 2008 for 
$25 billion in new loans.43 The outgoing Bush Administration drew from the 
TARP funds and conditioned the loan extension on Chrysler and GM submitting 
viable plans to restore solvency and profitability.44 When the Obama 
Administration assumed office in the winter of 2009, it appointed a Presidential 
Auto Task Force to assess, advise, and guide the restructuring of the 
companies.45 
The Auto Task Force was dissatisfied with the restructuring proposals 
presented to them by the auto manufacturers and, given the urgency of stemming 
losses and restoring consumer and investor confidence in the companies, it 
settled in the Spring of 2009 on a plan to use the bankruptcy process: Chrysler 
filed first on April 3046 and General Motors on June 1.47 The government’s $20 
billion investment in these companies and its offer to fund the company through 
bankruptcy essentially allowed the government to steer the restructuring.48 The 
government decided that Chrysler should be reorganized in bankruptcy under a 
section 363(b) sale: Chrysler would sell substantially all of its operating assets 
to a new entity (“New Chrysler”) who would assume portions of Chrysler’s 
liabilities to trade creditors, unfunded pensions, and unfunded health benefits, 
and pay $2 billion that would be distributed among Chrysler’s secured and 
priority claims.49 Fiat S.p.A. would provide New Chrysler with fuel-efficient 
vehicle platforms, a worldwide distribution network and new management, in 
return for 20% of the common stock and rights to acquire additional 15% stake 
upon meeting specified performance milestones, including fuel-efficiency 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 8. 
 44 Id. at 8–10. 
 45 Id. at 10–12; see Jesse Lee, GM & Chrysler, WHITE HOUSE: PRES. BARACK OBAMA (Mar. 30, 2009, 
12:53 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/03/30/gm-chrysler.  
 46 See Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 13. 
 47 Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 19. 
 48 For example, when the Task Force determined that the GM CEO, Rick Wagoner, should be replaced, 
it was able to effect the change without having the customary shareholder control rights. See Oversight Report, 
supra note 40, at 21. 
 49 Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 748 (2010). 
The chart below summarizes the treatment of the various unsecured claims. Id. at 754. 
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standards.50 The majority (55%) of the stock ownership went to the trust that had 
been set up to pay health benefits to Chrysler employees and retirees (VEBA).51 
The federal government received a much smaller stake of 8%. 
2. The Obama Administration’s Policy Objectives 
Clearly, one of the Obama Administration’s policy goals was to resolve the 
financial distress of Chrysler and GM, and the bankruptcy sale—free and clear 
of lien obligations—was the way it chose to do it. However, the financial 
recovery of these companies was not the only policy driving the 
Administration’s efforts. The federal government pursued two additional policy 
goals: (1) protecting auto workers and particularly their union, the United Auto 
Workers (UAW)52 and (2) promoting climate goals by building Chrysler’s 
ability to manufacture and sell smaller, more fuel-efficient cars in the United 
States.53 
First, as unfunded obligations of Chrysler and of GM, pensions and health 
benefits would recover nothing if the company liquidated. At the time of the 
bankruptcy filing, Chrysler owed $10 billion to the Voluntary Employees’ 
Beneficiary Association (VEBA) and had $3.5 billion in unfunded pension 
obligations.54 The protection of these benefits for retirees, even though an 
unsecured claim, was a key policy objective. The government’s plan for the 
bankruptcy sale ensured that the payout on these claims was vastly enhanced, 
with the VEBA receiving a new note for $4.6 billion and 55% of the common 
 
 50 See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 2009). Chrysler and Fiat, in fact, had been 
negotiating a collaboration before the government bailout, under which Fiat would produce small cars for 
Chrysler. See Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 12 n.37. The Obama Administration modified that relationship 
into one that would essentially merge the companies. Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 12–13, n.37. The Task 
Force claimed that Fiat was the only option available at that time. Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 12 n.37. 
 51 See Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 14–15. The restructuring of GM had a similar design as a 
section 363(b) sale from “Old GM” to “New GM”. Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 19. New GM also 
assumed liabilities and VEBA receiving (on account of its $20 billion claim) a new $2.5 billion note as well as 
$6.5 billion of the new entity’s preferred stock and 17.5%. Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 19–20. In GM’s 
bankruptcy, the government focused more on protecting labor interests rather than any environmental goals. 
Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 23. 
 52 See Todd J. Zywicki, The Chrysler and General Motors Bankruptcies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW 298, 305–06 (Barry E. Adler ed., 2020).  
 53 See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 35 (2011) (observing that the Obama Administration 
pursued its energy policy in the Chrysler bankruptcy); Zywicki, supra note 52, at 305 (suggesting that the goal 
of shifting Chrysler manufacturing to smaller cars did not promote the standard bankruptcy goal of 
reorganization). 
 54 See Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 14 n.49.  
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stock of New Chrysler.55 The bankruptcy sale was a more effective way of 
pursuing this objective than the confirmation process for a reorganization plan. 
Second, the Obama Administration hoped the United States auto industry 
would align with the government’s climate goals by producing and selling 
smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles in the United States. The Obama 
Administration entered office with ambitious environmental objectives related 
to vehicle emissions. 56 It reversed the decision of the Bush Administration to 
not regulate vehicle greenhouse gas emissions, accepted California’s application 
under the Clean Air Act to tighten requirements, and struck a deal with auto 
manufacturers on a single-tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions standard for the 
United States vehicle fleet.57 During Chrysler and GM’s period of financial 
distress, President Obama also promoted the Car Allowance Rebate System 
(“CARS” or commonly known as “Cash for Clunkers”).58 This program 
provided incentives for Americans to trade in “gas-guzzling” vehicles for more 
fuel-efficient alternatives.59 The program would hopefully boost car sales in the 
struggling economy and promote the purchase of greener cars.60 
As noted earlier, American auto manufacturers were saddled by cost 
structures that left them unable to compete globally in the manufacturing of fuel-
efficient vehicles. As Chrysler and GM began descending into financial trouble, 
President Obama famously asked his advisors, ‘why can’t they make a 
Corolla?’61 Historically, American companies manufactured larger vehicles like 
 
 55 Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 15. 
 56 The Administration addressed energy more broadly in its second term; it committed the United States 
to the Paris Agreement and enacted the Clean Power Plan to reduce carbon emissions from electricity generation. 
See Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, WHITE HOUSE: PRES. BARACK OBAMA, https:// 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/president-obama-climate-action-plan (last visited Mar. 28, 2021). 
 57 Its new regulations doubled the fuel efficiency standards for cars. See Press Release, White House, 
Pres. Barack Obama, Obama Administration Finalizes Historic 54.5 MPG Fuel Efficiency Standards (Aug. 28, 
2012) (available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/28/obama-administration-
finalizes-historic-545-MPG-fuel-efficiency-standard). 
 58 Jennifer Liberto, Cash for Clunkers Extension Signed into Law, CNN MONEY (Aug. 7, 2009, 11:43 
AM), https://money.cnn.com/2009/08/07/autos/clunkers_continues/ (quoting President Obama: “Now, more 
American consumers will have the chance to purchase newer, more fuel-efficient cars and the American 
economy will continue to get a much-needed boost.”). 
 59 Id. 
 60 See id. (noting that “[t]he sales results indicate that consumers are buying more fuel-efficient vehicles 
than most people expected” and that “many of the . . . biggest reported year-over-year sales gains were small 
crossovers, a fact that several of the top automakers attributed to the Cash for Clunkers program.”). 
 61 See Andrew Clark, GM Nearly Quit Detroit, Says Ex-Car Tsar (Sept. 10, 2010), https://www. 
theguardian.com/business/2010/sep/06/general-motors-bailout-rattner-obama; see generally Todd J. Zywicki, 
The Auto Bailout and the Rule of Law, 7 NAT’L AFFS. 66 (2011), https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/ 
detail/the-auto-bailout-and-the-rule-of-law (highlighting the Obama Administration’s frustration with GM and 
Chrysler). 
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pickup trucks and SUVs because their prices could cover the high union labor 
costs in the United States.62 Without significant encouragement or influence 
from the government, American companies like Chrysler and GM were unlikely 
to adapt to shifting consumer demand and transition to smaller vehicles. 
The federal government has tools to pursue both these policy goals: 
protecting the pension and health benefits of workers in the industry and 
encouraging the production of smaller, fuel-efficient cars. It could, for example, 
guarantee retirement benefit plans and be subrogated to the rights of the plans 
against the employer. But this would require very substantial appropriation and 
bureaucratic structure. With respect to fuel efficiency, regulation was used to 
tighten fuel efficiency standards. However, this was far from easy politically. It 
is therefore not surprising that the government would seize on the bankruptcy 
process to amplify the influence from its TARP-sourced funding and promote 
these policy goals. 
3. How Government Used Its Leverage in Bankruptcy 
As we noted earlier, the government gained control of the governance of 
Chrysler and GM through its investment in the two distressed companies and, 
once in control, the government restructured the auto manufacturers through a 
363(b) sale.63 Although a debtor must obtain judicial approval of its sale, the 
courts are particularly deferential if they perceive urgency in preventing further 
losses of value (the “melting ice cube”) and there are unlikely to be many 
bidders.64 The bankruptcy court authorized the proposed sale transaction in 
Chrysler on June 1, 2009, and the authorization was upheld by the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals.65 
The government’s design of the sale was profoundly influenced by its policy 
goals. The Obama Administration sought to pursue its fuel efficiency goal by 
ensuring that Fiat would be the controlling shareholder of New Chrysler, while 
also ensuring that the company would subsequently not oppose the proposed 
 
 62 See Todd J. Zywicki, The Corporatist Legacy of the Auto Bailouts, L. & LIBERTY (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2014/01/13/the-corporatist-legacy-of-the-auto- bailouts/.  
 63 See Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 21 (highlighting how the government’s investment put it in the 
driver seat, steering the restructuring). 
 64 In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d 108, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 65 Id. at 127. The Second Circuit’s judgment was vacated by the United States Supreme Court on grounds 
of mootness. See In re Chrysler, 592 F.3d 370, 370 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the judgement be vacated and 
remanded “with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.”). 
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increases in fuel economy standards.66 Although Chrysler had contacted 
unsuccessfully a number of other auto manufacturers in 2008 and although the 
Auto Task Force alleged that there were no other bidders, the design of the sale 
process made it highly unlikely that any new bidder would emerge. First, the 
auction was set so that any potential buyer had to bid for the company as a whole, 
rather than a piecemeal sale. There may have been competing interests in buying 
just Chrysler’s Jeep business or some of its real estate holdings and such 
fragmented sale might have yielded a higher payout for creditors. However, the 
bankruptcy judge authorized the auction of Chrysler only as a going concern. 
Second, the bidder would have to assume very significant liabilities for pension 
and health benefits, as well as some dealership contracts.67 This would ensure 
that these liabilities would be covered without the federal government needing 
to pay them, while also further limiting the likelihood of another bidder. As we 
discuss below, a sale subject to liabilities yields less than otherwise, raises the 
recovery of assumed liabilities, and lowers the bankruptcy payout to other 
claims. Third, other bidders would have been discouraged by knowing they were 
disfavored by the federal executive’s policy-motivated strategy.68  
4. Who Bore the Cost of Policy Goals? 
Several pension and retirement funds––including those of police and 
teachers—had invested in first-lien bonds issued by Chrysler. Although they 
would receive first priority against the cash proceeds from the sale ($2 billion), 
their payout would be only about 29% of the amount of their claims. They 
objected to the sale on the grounds that, given the value distributed to the 
unfunded pensions and VEBA in the form of new debt and stock, the transaction 
effectively subordinated their first liens to those unsecured claims. Chrysler 
argued in response that, in return for these benefits, the company received value 
 
 66 See Motion of Debtors and Debtors in Possession, Pursuant to Sections 105, 363 and 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 6004 and 6006 at 19, In re Chrysler, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-50002) [hereinafter Motion of Chrysler to Approve Bidding Procedures] (stating that 
debtor had scoured the globe and only found Fiat as a buyer). Critics argued the sale was intended to allow 
Chrysler to fail slowly over the course of several years in a way that would coincide with Fiat’s entry into the 
U.S. market, instead of closing Chrysler immediately. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Car Trouble 4 (Univ. of Chi. 
Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 551, 2011) (arguing that the hope was that “[w]ith luck, Fiat could make 
its cars at factories that had been producing Chryslers while taking advantage of part of Chrysler’s existing 
distribution system.”). 
 67 See Roe & Skeel, supra note 49, at 747–48 (observing that “[b]ids proposing alternative configurations 
of the UAW and VEBA obligations were discouraged or, more realistically, barred.”). 
 68 Roe & Skeel, supra note 49, at 748. In addition, potential bidders were given only a week in bankruptcy 
to submit bids because the court had determined the sale as an emergency. To be sure, Chrysler’s distress was 
well known, and any other auto manufacturer would have had plenty of time to begin diligence and negotiations 
before the bankruptcy filing. Roe & Skeel, supra note 49, at 747.  
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in return for concessions in a new agreement with the UAW that included, for 
example, a commitment not to strike for six years.69 But there was no support 
for the argument that this consideration was reasonably equivalent. Although the 
government publicly rationalized this special treatment as necessary to prevent 
worker strikes, this threat of strikes was speculation at the time.70 The 
lienholders also had grounds to question whether Fiat’s contribution was 
reasonably equivalent to its acquired stake in Chrysler’s operations. 
While bankruptcy law tends to require that distributions follow absolute 
priority––to ensure that the higher priority claim is paid in full before anything 
is distributed to a lower priority claim or interest––claimholders are free to 
consent to lesser treatment. In Chrysler, the court found that a substantial 
majority of the first-lien holders had voted, consistent with the requirements 
under their loan and collateral agreements, to approve the sale.71 However, 
pension funds holding these liens argued that 70% of this debt was held by 
Citigroup, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley––financial 
institutions who were beholden to the U.S. government’s bank bailouts earlier 
in the financial crisis. The four banks had together received $90 billion from the 
Treasury.72 In the end, the court was not persuaded by the objection and allowed 
the consummation of the sale.73 
In sum, the federal government executed two policy goals––protecting 
worker benefits and promoting manufacture of fuel-efficient cars––by 
combining the leverage from its distressed financing with the power of the 
debtor to structure a sale in bankruptcy. Although the government bore the risk 
 
 69 In re Chrysler, LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 70 Professor Zywicki notes that: 
neither Rattner nor any other member of the Auto Task Force provides any evidence to 
support the assertion that career GM and Chrysler employees would strike the 
companies into liquidation instead of accepting wage and benefit concessions that would 
bring them into line with foreign transplants but still far exceeded the wages of most 
U.S. manufacturing workers. 
Zywicki, supra note 52, at 306. 
 71 In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 119–20. Technically, a majority of the lienholders had the right to authorize 
the collateral agent who would then direct the collateral trustee to authorize the sale. Under the terms of the debt 
issuance, the majority vote was binding on all the lienholders holding notes under that indenture. 
 72 See Neil King Jr. & Jeffrey McCracken, U.S. Forced Chrysler’s Creditors to Blink, WALL ST. J. 
(May 11, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124199948894005017. Additionally, these banks, particularly 
Citigroup, were under threat of nationalization. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 49, at 743. 
 73 See In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 118–19; see Brief of Appellants Indiana State Police Pension Trust et 
al. at 61–63, In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 09-2311-bk) [hereinafter Brief of Indiana State 
Police Pension Trust]; Christopher Jensen, Chrysler Reverses Stance on Product Liability, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
28, 2009), https://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/28/chrysler-reverses-stance-on-product-liability/?mtrref= 
www.google.com&assetType=REGIWALL.  
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of providing the financing, the first-lien holders pointed out that they were 
compelled to bear a large cost. Other creditors were similarly subordinated 
effectively to the workers’ claims, including pre-bankruptcy products liability 
holders who were arguably as vulnerable to Chrysler’s insolvency as its 
workers.74 Our discussion of the policy of protecting the claims of wildfire 
victims in the PG&E bankruptcy (below) provides a contrast to the treatment of 
products liability claimants in Chrysler and GM. One might speculate that this 
reflects the political clout of (in descending order) workers, California residents 
who lost property to wildfires because of the actions of their public utility, and 
purchasers of defective vehicles. In Part V, we revisit these important 
distributional issues as we examine the dangers of using bankruptcy to promote 
public policy goals. Before we do, we describe the activism of the government 
of California in the PG&E bankruptcy, a decade after Chrysler and GM. 
B. Pacific Gas & Electric  
Perhaps the most recent and salient example of a governmental entity using 
bankruptcy law to implement government policy is the 2019 bankruptcy filing 
of California’s giant privately owned public utility, the 150-year-old PG&E 
which serves more than 16 million people.75 PG&E filed for bankruptcy because 
of its role in a series of wildfires that caused more than $30 billion in damages 
and its inability to defend itself against a flood of tort litigation.76 But, as we will 
 
 74 Christopher Jensen reported that:  
consumer groups, such as Public Citizen, the Center for Auto Safety and the Center for Justice 
& Democracy, remain unhappy that Chrysler had not changed its position on another element 
of the bankruptcy settlement. It persuaded the court not to make the new company responsible 
for suits that had already been filed. That means people who were previously injured and filed 
suits have no chance of recovering any significant funds because they are among the so-called 
unsecured creditors. 
Jensen, supra note 73. 
 75 150 Years of Growth and Change, PG&E CORP., http://www.pgecorp.com/150_non_flash/index.html 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2020) (showing timeline of electrification of California); Guy Kovner, PG&E Trims or 
Removes 30,000 Fire-Damaged Trees in Northern and Central California, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/news/pge-trims-or-removes-30000-fire-damaged-trees-in-northern-
and-central-cal/ (showing PG&E service territory). 
 76 By the time PG&E filed for bankruptcy, it was already on probation for a pipeline explosion in San 
Bruno in 2010 which killed eight people and destroyed thirty-eight homes. Maria Dinzeo, PG&E Accused of 
Violating Probation With 2018 Wildfires, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www. 
courthousenews.com/pge-accused-of-violating-probation-with-2017-wildfires/. It remained on probation in 
front of Judge Alsup of the Northern District of California for the entire pendency of the bankruptcy period, 
which created a strange dynamic as the company was faced with two federal judges with enormous power over 
its operations—Judge Alsup in the criminal probation proceedings and the bankruptcy judge. See Rebecca Smith 
& Peg Brickley, In PG&E Bankruptcy, Another Judge May Play Key Role, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2019, 8:15 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-pg-e-bankruptcy-another-judge-may-play-key-role-11548854129. 
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explain, the bankruptcy is better understood as being driven by climate change 
and PG&E’s complicated role as a vehicle for California’s energy policies. 
PG&E’s problems could have been solved by the state legislature’s powers to 
regulate and appropriate, had the legislature chosen to do so. But by using the 
bankruptcy process as a vehicle for PG&E’s restructuring, the government of 
California was able to resolve, at least for now, the thorny problem oof PG&E’s 
solvency,with the aid of private sector capital, and to protect important public 
policies. Importantly, the outcome of the bankruptcy was different than what 
would have happened if it were a purely private sector bankruptcy, where the 
reorganization might have compromised all unsecured liabilities, including 
those of fire survivors. 
In this Part, we describe the policy goals that the government of California 
implements through its regulation of PG&E, how the State was able to protect 
those goals through the Chapter 11 proceeding, particularly by forcing PG&E to 
make concessions towards policy goals that may have been much harder without 
the bargaining power that Chapter 11 provided to the State.  
1. The State’s Policy Goals with PG&E 
Like all public utilities, PG&E is a highly regulated firm, but it advances 
State policies that are far greater than its role as a mere supplier of power.77 The 
company is regulated directly by the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC), and CPUC has an oversight role over basic corporate decisions such as 
the price that PG&E customers pay for electricity.78 For the purposes of our 
discussion, we will focus on two public policies that PG&E advances within 
California’s system of government: (1) the transition to clean energy; and (2) 
subsidizing the insurance of the households of Californians against the risks of 
 
 77 See PG&E, PUBLIC SAFETY POWER SHUTOFF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 3 (2020), https://www.pge. 
com/pge_global/common/pdfs/safety/emergency-preparedness/natural-disaster/wildfires/Public-Safety-Power-
Shutoff-Policies-and-Procedures.pdf (providing PG&E’s internal policies and guidelines regarding the 
prevention of wildfires); see also Anne C. Mulkern, California Tests New Strategies to Prevent Deadly Wildfires, 
SCI. AM. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/california-tests-new-strategies-to-
prevent-deadly-wildfires (describing statewide fire prevention projects and priorities). 
 78 See Nicholas Iovino, PG&E Seeks Rate Hike to Fund Wildfire Safety Measures, COURTHOUSE NEWS 
SERV. (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/pge-seeks-rate-hike-to-fund-wildfire-safety-measures/ 
(describing PG&E’s twenty-day hearings with CPUC in response to a proposed utility rate increase). This 
oversight role had unprecedented consequences in the bankruptcy case as fire survivors were able to use CPUC 
processes to obtain access to PG&E’s management that otherwise does not occur in Chapter 11 cases. For 
example, Will Abrams, an outspoken fire survivor who is not an attorney by training, was able to use CPUC 
processes to question PG&E’s CEO for about two hours. See J.D. Morris, ‘Sometimes Things Just Break’: PG&E 
CEO Grilled by Fire Victim, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 25, 2020, 8:08 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/ 
article/Sometimes-things-just-break-PG-E-CEO-15084426.php. 
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wildfires, which have greatly increased over the past decade due to climate 
change. We discuss each in turn. 
First, California had been using PG&E as a catalyst for its transition to clean 
energy before the most recent bankruptcy filing.79 Essentially, the State 
implemented a series of purchase mandates that required PG&E to purchase 
progressively more and more of its energy from clean energy suppliers.80 PG&E 
had to search for sufficient supply to meet these new requirements and an entire 
new industry grew up around PG&E, as PG&E long-term purchase orders 
enabled many suppliers of clean energy to get the financing they needed to build 
or expand facilities.81 The program was extremely successful, stimulating the 
development of the clean energy industry in California and setting the State on 
a track to be 100% reliant on clean energy sources.82 
Second, PG&E had implicitly been transformed into an insurer of last resort 
for Californians living in areas that suddenly had much higher wildfire risk 
because of climate change.83 This was the unintentional result of two laws that 
constrain PG&E’s activities. First, PG&E is legally required to provide services 
to Californians in remote regions, which it did through an electric grid with 
equipment that was so old that PG&E had, in some cases, lost track of how old 
some of it was.84 As the climate warmed in the 21st century, California was beset 
by an unprecedented drought that left the State’s forests a veritable tinderbox, 
waiting for a spark from a PG&E tower that could cause billions of dollars in 
 
 79 See Dale Kasler, California Seeks 100% Clean Energy. Why PG&E’s Bankruptcy Could Imperil That 
Plan, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 11, 2019, 10:20 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/ 
capitol-alert/article231413083.html (discussing PG&E’s role in California’s clean energy infrastructure). 
 80 S.B. 1078, 2002 Leg., 527th Sess. (Cal. 2002) (outlining clean energy initiative that initially begun in 
2002); see AMANDA SINGH, 2018 CALIFORNIA RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2018) 
(describing successive laws that have expanded California’s renewable purchase mandates). 
 81 Christine Cordner, Sempra, Con Edison Development Partner on Renewable Energy Development, 
SNL ENERGY POWER DAILY (May 22, 2013), https://www.proquest.com/docview/1356819864/ 
C32FC1778B684290PQ/1 (describing the sale of two photovoltaic plants which were developed under a Power 
Purchase Agreements (“PPA”) with PG&E); see PG&E Awards 20-Year PPA for 3 California Solar Power 
Projects, POWER ENG’G (May 18, 2016), https://www.power-eng.com/2016/05/18/pg-e-awards-20-year-ppa-
for-3-california-solar-power-projects/#gref (illustrating how PPAs with PG&E allow companies to build and 
commission power plants). 
 82 Betsy Lillian, PG&E Hits California’s Renewables Goal Years Ahead of Schedule, N. A. WINDPOWER 
(Feb. 21, 2018), https://nawindpower.com/pge-hits-californias-renewables-goal-years-ahead-schedule. 
 83 See PG&E, Comments to Commission on Catastrophic Wildfire Cost and Recovery 1, 3 (Apr. 22, 
2019), https://opr.ca.gov/wildfire/docs/comments/20190424-wildfire_comments_04-22-2019_Pacific_Gas_ 
and_Electric.pdf (“IOUs [investor-owned utilities] (through their investors) are left to shoulder all costs of 
property damage from catastrophic wildfires, as well as all attorneys’ fees and expert costs from litigation, if 
their facilities were involved in ignition of a fire.”). 
 84 Russell Gold, PG&E: The First Climate-Change Bankruptcy, Probably Not the Last, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-wildfires-and-the-first-climate-change-bankruptcy-11547820006. 
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damages with a single gust of wind.85 Second, under the California State 
Constitution, private parties charged by the State to carry out public uses have a 
responsibility to pay damages for damages caused to others.86 For PG&E this 
means, in effect, that the company is strictly liable for any fires caused by its 
equipment, regardless of fault.87 Even if a homeowner had insurance, the 
insurance company would normally bring a subrogation claim against PG&E 
and the entire system of home insurance in growing swaths of California 
depended on PG&E’s role as insurer of last resort.88 
2. Background to the Bankruptcy Filing 
PG&E’s Chapter 11 filing was driven by its inability to reduce significantly 
the dangers that running power lines over increasingly dry fire-prone land 
created for the company.89 The company’s crisis began in October 2017 as heavy 
winds buffeted Northern California and a series of wildfires caused by PG&E 
equipment left the company as much as $15 billion in dollars in potential 
liability.90 The company could not eliminate the risk that wind posed to its 
equipment in the near-term, as “undergrounding” its above-ground power 
equipment was cost prohibitive and reducing the risk posed by high winds would 
require cutting down more than 100 million trees, many of which were not 
located on PG&E property, the cost of which the company estimated at $150 
billion.91 PG&E was also unable to offload this risk to the insurance market and 
could not obtain private insurance that came close to the scale of the risks it took 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 See Cal. Const., art. I, § 19 (stating that “[p]rivate property may be taken or damaged for a public use 
and only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, 
the owner”); Arvo Van Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation: Unintended Physical Damage, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 
431 (1969). 
 87 See Declaration of Jason P. Wells in Support of First Day Motions and Related Relief at 3, In re PG&E, 
603 B.R. 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-30088) [hereinafter Wells Declaration]. 
 88 See David R. Baker, Fight Over PG&E’s Liability in Wine Country Fires Just Beginning, S.F. CHRON. 
(June 9, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Fight-over-PG-E-s-liability-in-Wine-Country-
12981642.php. 
 89 Peter Eavis & Ivan Penn, The Struggle to Control PG&E, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2019/02/13/business/energy-environment/pge-wildfire-bankruptcy-control.html 
 90 See Wells Declaration, supra note 87, at 21–22 (describing passage of S.B. 901 fire relief bill, 
estimating PG&E’s liability for damages at $15 billion); accord Jeff St. John, California Lawmakers Pass PG&E 
Wildfire Relief Bill, Let Grid Regionalization Expire, GREENTECH MEDIA (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www. 
greentechmedia.com/articles/read/california-passes-pge-wildfire-relief-bill-but-grid-regionalization-fails. 
 91 Jim Christie, PG&E Puts Cost of Judge’s Wildfire Plan at up to $150 Billion, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pg-e-us-wildfire/pge-puts-cost-of-judges-wildfire-plan-at-up-to-150-
billion-idUSKCN1PI00P. 
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on.92 Making things worse, CPUC decided that fire-related damages beyond a 
public utility’s commercial insurance would need to be paid by the company’s 
shareholders and not through higher rates on end-users, leaving PG&E on the 
brink of insolvency.93 While the California State Legislature allowed PG&E to 
borrow money to pay some of the damages from the 2017 fires, it did not provide 
a long-term solution to the company’s basic dilemma of strict liability, climate 
change and fire risk.94 
The next year quickly turned into PG&E’s worst nightmare, as dry weather 
conditions and high winds led to a string of destructive fires and California’s 
government signaled disinterest in providing additional assistance. The fires of 
2018 included the worst fire in California history, the Camp Fire, which 
destroyed 14,000 homes and killed 84 people95 and caused more than $16.5 
billion in estimated losses.96 If this was a preview of what PG&E’s “new 
normal” of “hotter, dryer summers” would look like, the company would need 
substantial help from the State.97 Adding the Camp Fire onto PG&E’s existing 
fire liability from 2017 as well as some earlier fires, the company faced as much 
as $30 billion in damages.98 The weight of tort litigation took a continuing toll 
 
 92 PG&E only had $800 million insurance for the entire 2017 fire season. See Nicole Friedman, Disaster 
Losses Close in on Record, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/with-california-wildfires-
insurers-losses-keep-spiraling-higher-1513083600. For the 2018 fire season, PG&E was able to obtain $1.4 
billion in insurance. See Wells Declaration, supra note 87, at 16. 
 93 Historically, utilities had been able to convince regulators to pass tort costs on to ratepayers when they 
convinced their regulator that they had “acted prudently.” See Order Denying Application for Decision at 5, In 
re San Diego Gas & Electric Co., Case No. 17-11-033 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n 2017). In a November 2017 
decision, CPUC denied San Diego Gas & Electric’s application to raise customer electricity rates to recover 
money for three 2007 fires. Dale Kasler, This State Ruling Could Hurt PG&E in Fight Over Who Pays in Wine 
Country Fires, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article187429948.html. 
 94 In September 2017, the State passed a law that allowed PG&E to borrow money to pay for some of the 
2017 fire costs if it could prove it had “acted reasonably” and surcharge its customers to pay for the borrowings. 
See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8386 (Deering 2018). The State also agreed to spend $1 billion to help PG&E 
reduce fire risk by clearing brush and setting controlled fires. See Melody Gutierrez & David R. Baker, 
Legislature Passes Bill to Help Protect PG&E from Wildfire Damage Suits, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 2, 2018), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Legislature-passes-bill-to-help-protect-PG-E-from-13199141.php. 
While helpful, this bill was nowhere near enough to offer PG&E a long-term solution to its problems. 
 95 Ray Sanchez & Augie Martin, 84 Victims of 2018 Camp Fire Given Voice at Emotional PG&E 
Hearing, CNN (June 17, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/17/us/pge-camp-fire-california-victim-impact-
statements/index.html. 
 96 Alejandra Reyes-Velarde, California’s Camp Fire Was the Costliest Global Disaster: Last Year, 
Insurance Report Shows, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-camp-fire-
insured-losses-20190111-story.html. 
 97 Phil Matier & Andy Ross, Capitol Debate on Utilities’ Fire Liability Sparks a Lobbying Frenzy, S.F. 
CHRON. (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/Capitol-debate-on-utilities-
fire-liability-13156339.php. 
 98 J.D. Morris, Legal Barrage Has PG&E on the Ropes, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 2, 2018), https://www. 
pressreader.com/usa/san-francisco-chronicle-late-edition-sunday/20181202/281522227155243. 
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on PG&E, bleeding the company of more than $70 million in attorneys’ fees.99 
California’s legislature considered providing help to PG&E,100 but PG&E 
withdrew from negotiations with the legislature and decided to look somewhere 
else for relief—the bankruptcy court.101 
3. The Chapter 11 Petition 
PG&E filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on January 29, 2019 and it quickly 
became very clear that PG&E’s path out of bankruptcy ran through 
Sacramento.102 While Chapter 11 provided PG&E with a refuge from lawsuits, 
the company needed regulatory relief to reorganize successfully.103 The federal 
bankruptcy judge could not solve PG&E’s situation, which was a function of 
regulatory mandates (providing power to climate changed afflicted areas) and 
state law (strict liability). PG&E could only become solvent again if it won 
liability reform or permission to raise electricity rates, which had to come from 
the California State Legislature and the CPUC.104 
Sacramento’s bargaining power was crucial because the company could 
have used bankruptcy law in two ways that would have been inimical to the State 
government’s policy priorities. First, PG&E could have sought to confirm a plan 
 
 99 See Declaration of Paul H. Zumbro in Support of Application of Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) 
and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014(a) and 2016 for Authority to Retain and Employ Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP as 
Corporate and Litigation Counsel for Debtors Effective as of the Petition Date at 8, In re PG&E, 603 B.R. 471 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-30088).  
 100 David R. Baker & Romy Varghese, California Fire Relief for PG&E May Not Include the Fix It Wants, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-26/pg-e-california-fire-relief-may-
not-include-fix-utility-wants?sref=E6x1oDFD (discussion of S.B. 901’s implications for PG&E and 
consumers).  
 101 Lily Jamali, Lawmakers Say No PG&E Bailout for 2018 Wildfires, KQED (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.kqed.org/news/11720734/lawmakers-say-no-pge-bailout-for-2018-wildfires. 
 102 J.D. Morris, PG&E Files for Bankruptcy, Seeking Protection from Wildfire Costs, S.F. CHRON. 
(Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/PG-E-officially-files-for-bankruptcy-seeking-
13569611.php. 
 103 PG&E’s conduct heading into bankruptcy suggests that the company’s board understood this, even if 
they did not file for Chapter 11 with a clear way through the process. In S.B. 901, California required PG&E to 
provide “15 days notice” before any bankruptcy filing. See Dale Kasler, PG&E Is Going Bankrupt. What that 
Means for Ratepayers, Wildfire Survivors, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.sacbee.com/news/ 
business/article224525395.html. PG&E complied with this law in mid-January 2019 even though the law was 
likely not enforceable. This notice was not costless to PG&E, as it created all the disruption associated with a 
bankruptcy filing without the protection that bankruptcy courts can offer to debtors in Chapter 11. See Russell 
Gold et al., PG&E Prepares for Bankruptcy Amid Wildfire Fallout, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www. 
wsj.com/articles/pg-e-initiates-chapter-11-reorganization-for-utility-11547465293. 
 104 In re PG&E, 611 B.R. 110, 115 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019). PG&E could have also obtained relief from 
the California Supreme Court, which could have interpreted the State Constitution to not require privately owned 
public utilities to be strictly liable to wildfire victims. Id. at 117–18. PG&E asked the California Supreme Court 
to address the issue in 2018, but they denied certiorari. 
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that did not pay fire survivors—owed some $30 billion—in full.105 This would 
have caused an uproar among fire survivors and jeopardized the willingness of 
private sector investors to finance the privately owned public utilities in Los 
Angeles and San Diego.106 Second, PG&E could have jeopardized the State’s 
clean power goals by tearing up power purchase agreements to buy clean 
power.107 Chapter 11 allows firms to exit contracts that are unfavorable and to 
use the threat of doing so to force contractual counterparties to renegotiate deals. 
PG&E could have saved somewhere between $1 billion108 and $2.5 billion109 a 
year by tearing up clean energy contracts.110 
With this in mind, Governor Newsom immediately convened a ‘strike team’ 
of bankruptcy attorneys and energy experts to study the situation for sixty days 
and produce a framework balancing California’s competing policy goals.111 The 
strike team produced a public report that offered a menu of solutions to PG&E’s 
predicament, including the one that Newsom would settle on: creating a 
catastrophic wildfire fund to provide billions of dollars in insurance to the State’s 
major utilities, including PG&E.112 The wildfire fund would be capitalized with 
 
 105 Ivan Penn, PG&E Says Wildfire Victims Back Settlement in Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/business/energy-environment/pge-bankruptcy-wildfire-victims.html 
(noting that PG&E was, “[f]acing an estimated $30 billion in wildfire liabilities.”). 
 106 Romy Varghese, PG&E, Edison May Not Get California Help on Fires by July 12, BLOOMBERG (July 5, 
2019 12:11 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-05/pg-e-edison-may-not-get-california-s-help-
on-fires-by-july-12. 
 107 Indeed, PG&E started the Chapter 11 by immediately filing a request for the bankruptcy judge to 
declare the company had the authority to break these contracts. See Jeff St. John, PG&E’s Bankruptcy Judge 
Leaves Door Open to Shedding Renewables Contracts, GREENTECH MEDIA (June 10, 2019), https://www. 
greentechmedia.com/articles/read/pge-bankruptcy-judge-leaves-door-open-to-severing-renewable-energy-
contract. 
 108 Garrett Hering, PG&E Could Save Billions by Shedding Pricey Power Supply Deals, Moody’s Finds, 
S&P GLOB. (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/r3wsfcG5 
olaZwvNUizePeQ2. 
 109 See St. John, supra note 107. 
 110 Jeff Manning & Steven Wilamowsky, Will PG&E Be Forced to Turn to PPAs to Get a Bankruptcy Exit 
Plan Confirmed?, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/will-pge-be-forced-to-turn-
to-ppas-to-get-a-bankruptcy-exit-plan-confirmed/575045/. 
 111 Julia Pyper, Governor Newsom Convenes ‘Strike Team’ to Release PG&E Strategy Within 60 Days, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/newsom-pge-strike-team-
60-days; see WILDFIRES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY FUTURE, REPORT FROM GOVERNOR 
NEWSOM’S STRIKE FORCE 1–4 (2019) [hereinafter Strike Force Report]. 
 112 In addition to the wildfire fund, the report also considered a solution that would be less helpful to PG&E 
(a ‘liquidity fund’ that would provide PG&E with money to pay wildfire damages claims while awaiting CPUC 
permission to pass costs onto ratepayers) and something PG&E would have liked more (a state law abandoning 
strict liability and moving to a negligence standard for fire claims). See Strike Force Report, supra note 111, at 
3. Given PG&E’s unpopularity, it was unsurprising that State Legislature offered a cool response to the most 
helpful solution, which could have been seen as letting PG&E ‘off the hook’ for future fires. See Rob Nikolewski, 
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contributions from each of the State’s major public utilities’ shareholders and 
ratepayers and would function as a vehicle for spreading risks over all three 
major utilities’ customer bases.113 In exchange for liability reform, PG&E would 
need to commit to paying pre-bankruptcy fire survivors in full, maintain 
commitments to clean energy goals, and commit to a “safety-first culture.”114 
As the bankruptcy began to move forward, Governor Newsom filed a 
pleading in the bankruptcy court demanding that PG&E make significant policy 
concessions and satisfy the State’s interest if it wanted to emerge from 
bankruptcy.115 He also put PG&E on notice that the State would only create the 
proposed new regulatory framework if PG&E demonstrated, among other 
things: (1) an improvement in their safety culture to reduce the risk of fires; and 
(2) significant contributions from PG&E’s shareholders towards reducing the 
risks of wildfires. 116 He noted that the strike team had only recently completed 
its work and that he was working to turn it into legislation that would 
“circumscribe the [restructuring] options for PG&E.”117 PG&E had also 
appointed a new board of directors shortly after filing for bankruptcy, and 
Governor Newsom expressed skepticism in the new directors: 
PG&E’s governance actions following the commencement of the 
Chapter 11 Cases also raise concern. PG&E’s newly appointed board 
of directors is populated by hedge fund financiers, out-of-state 
executives and other individuals with little or no experience in utility 
operations, regulation and safety. PG&E has done little to instill 
confidence that it appreciates the urgency of resolving wildfire claims 
or that it is developing with due dispatch a viable business plan that 
will allow PG&E to provide safe, reliable, and affordable power to the 
people of Northern California.118 
4. AB1054: The State Charts the Path PG&E Would Walk Through 
Chapter 11 
Subsequently, the State Legislature unveiled a law, Assembly Bill 1054 
 
Mixed Reaction to Newsom’s ‘Strike Force’ Report on California Wildfires, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (April 12, 
2019, 3:58 PM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/energy-green/story/2019-04-12/mixed-reaction-to-
newsoms-strike-force-report-on-california-wildfires. 
 113 See Strike Force Report, supra note 111, at 38. 
 114 Strike Force Report, supra note 111, at 46. 
 115 Limited Objection of Governor Gavin Newsom to Corrected Motion of Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1121(d) to Extend Exclusive Periods, In re PG&E, 611 B.R. 110 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-30088).  
 116 Id. at 3–4.  
 117 See id. at 6. 
 118 See id. at 4. 
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(AB1054),119  that offered PG&E the liability protection it needed to restructure 
in Chapter 11 in exchange for concessions that protected the State’s policy 
interests.120 As this is the first state law that we are aware of that effectively 
dictated the outcome of a Chapter 11 plan, it is worth tracing its contours in 
detail. 
Essentially, the State used PG&E’s need for the wildfire fund to dictate the 
remaining course of the bankruptcy process. The law put the bankruptcy case on 
a tight leash, giving the company until June 30, 2021—about a year after 
AB1054 was passed—to leave bankruptcy.121 Any plan of reorganization would 
need acceptance of the CPUC, which was directed to review the company’s 
board and management team “in light of the electrical corporation’s safety 
history.”122 AB1054 required PG&E to propose a “rate neutral” plan, which 
would guard lawmakers against the inevitable outrage that would have 
accompanied PG&E appearing to pay for wildfire damages by passing the costs 
onto customers.123 Importantly, all pre-bankruptcy fire victims would need to be 
paid in full.124 Taken together these provisions would force PG&E to implement 
a solvent debtor plan that paid all fire survivors in full and reorganized very 
quickly with a board of directors and management team that met the State’s 
approval. As an added benefit, fire survivors and bondholders each had claims 
of the same priority, so the requirement that fire survivors had to be paid in full 
also meant that bankruptcy law would require the similarly situated bondholders 
to be paid in full, protecting (perhaps unintentionally) the State’s reputation for 
credit-worthiness on Wall Street. If PG&E ended up being sold in a bankruptcy 
auction, the State added a new requirement that any buyer of PG&E would 
guarantee the wages and benefits of its workforce for three years. This helped to 
lock in the deal structure that the State envisioned.125 
The State also used AB1054 to protect the State’s climate goals and increase 
its ability to oversee PG&E’s conduct. To get access to the wildfire fund, PG&E 
would need to propose a plan that was consistent with the State’s climate 
 
 119 Assembly Bill 1054 was codified into California law as Section 3291 of the California Public Utility 
Code. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3291 (Deering 2019). 
 120 Chron. Ed. Bd., Editorial: AB1054 Will Change the Way California Deals with Wildfires, so the 
Legislature Needs to Get It Right, S.F. CHRON. (July 9, 2019, 5:02 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/ 
editorials/article/Editorial-AB1054-will-change-the-way-California-14083760.php.  
 121 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3291(b) (Deering 2019).  
 122 Id. § 3291(b)(1)(C).  
 123 Id. § 3291(b)(1)(E). 
 124 Id. § 3291(b)(1)(B). 
 125 Id. § 3291(b)(1)(D). 
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goals.126 This blocked PG&E from using bankruptcy powers to exit clean energy 
purchase agreements, forcing PG&E to keep its promises to clean energy 
producers that California’s transition to renewables had been built on.127 The 
State also increased its oversight of PG&E by establishing a new Wildfire Safety 
Advisory Board and bolstering the CPUC with a new Wildfire Safety 
Division.128 
In exchange for these new burdens, PG&E’s shareholders were given 
significant protection from future fire liability through favorable changes to the 
“cost recovery” process. In general, utilities like PG&E can only pass costs from 
wildfires on to ratepayers as “rate increases” if CPUC finds the increase justified 
andthe Commission became much less willing to allow PG&E to pass fire costs 
onto customers in 2017, effectively rendering the company insolvent.129 
AB1054 created a much more predictable cost recovery process with the 
discretionary portions of CPUC’s review reoriented in favor of the utilities. 
Going forward, PG&E would be able to obtain cost recovery if it could 
demonstrate it had acted reasonably130 and, if PG&E went through a regulatory 
process to obtain a safety certificate,131 the safety certificate would transfer the 
burden of proof to CPUC or any other third parties to rebut a presumption that 
PG&E’s conduct had been reasonable.132 
  
 
 126 Id. § 3291(b)(1)(D). 
 127 Jeff St. John, California Assembly Passes $21B Wildfire Fund for Utilities, GREENTECH MEDIA 
(July 11, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/california-assembly-passes-21b-wildfire-fund-
for-utilities. This decision cost PG&E’s shareholders billions of dollars but ensured that the State’s climate goals 
would not be negatively impacted by the PG&E Chapter 11. See Julian Spector, PG&E Pledges to Keep All 
Power Purchase Agreements Despite Bankruptcy, GREENTECH MEDIA (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www. 
greentechmedia.com/articles/read/pge-pledges-to-keep-all-power-purchase-agreements-but-some-already-
took-a-h.  
 128 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 326.1, 326.2. 
 129 Cost recovery had historically been granted so long as an electrical utility could show that it had acted 
“reasonably and prudently” based on what the utility knew or should have known at the time. See, e.g., In re S. 
Cal. Edison Co., No. 87-08-021, 1987 Cal. PUC LEXIS 588, at *28–29 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n June 15, 1987) 
(“The term ‘reasonable and prudent’ means that at a particular time any of the practices, methods, and acts 
engaged in by a utility follows the exercise of reasonable judgment in light of facts known or which should have 
been known at the time the decision was made.”).  
 130 “Reasonableness” would require a showing that the conduct leading to the cost increase was consistent 
with what a reasonable utility would have undertaken in good faith, under similar circumstances, at that relevant 
point in time. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 451.1(b). 
 131 Id. § 451.1(c). 
 132 Id.  
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5. Amid a Hedge Fund Brawl, the State Takes Control of the Bankruptcy 
Process 
At the same time that the State was busy crafting PG&E’s regulatory future, 
PG&E’s shareholders and creditors were engaged in a classic bankruptcy contest 
for control. PG&E’s shareholders were a group of deep-pocketed hedge funds 
who wanted to implement a restructuring plan that would leave them owning as 
much of the post-bankruptcy equity as possible.133 On the other side, the firm’s 
bondholders were a different group of deep-pocketed hedge funds that also 
wanted to control the company after bankruptcy.134 
The wildfire survivors entered the clash of Wall Street titans by joining 
forces with the company’s bondholders and bringing Governor Newsom into the 
fray. The wildfire survivors negotiated with both sides before declining PG&E’s 
(really their shareholders’) offer of $8.4 billion in payments to the fire victims 
and settling instead with bondholders for $13.5 billion.135 Judge Montali then 
gave the bondholders and fire survivors permission to sponsor their own rival 
plan of reorganization.136 PG&E’s shareholders decided to go forward with their 
own plan despite the objections of wildfire victims, who argued that PG&E’s 
plan would not pay them in full.137 Governor Newsom objected to this effort, 
filing an objection with the court arguing that the shareholders were engaged in: 
legal maneuvering . . . more focused on securing procedural 
advantages for their own pecuniary interests than on reaching a fair 
and expeditious resolution of this bankruptcy . . . These tactics may be 
commonplace in bankruptcy proceedings but they are unacceptable in 
these chapter 11 cases, which are causing ongoing harm to California, 
its residents and economy.138 
 
 133 J.D. Morris, Why Hedge Funds Are Fighting for Control of PG&E–and What It Means for You, S.F. 
CHRON. (July 23, 2019, 3:13 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Why-hedge-funds-are-fighting-for-
control-of-PG-E-14115025.php (noting that the hedge fund shareholders seek to implement a bankruptcy plan 
that would “allow the current equity owners to maintain control of the company during its reorganization.”). 
 134 Id.  
 135 Peg Brickley & Katherine Blunt, PG&E Bondholders Ally with Wildfire Victims to Propose New 
Bankruptcy Exit Plan, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2019, 8:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-bondholders-
ally-with-wildfire-victims-to-propose-new-bankruptcy-exit-plan-11568930574?mod=article_inline. 
 136 Peter Eavis, PG&E Bankruptcy Judge Gives Outside Group’s Plan a Chance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/business/energy-environment/pge-bankruptcy.html. 
 137 Objection of the Ad Hoc Committee of Senior Unsecured Noteholders to Debtors’ Motion to Enter into 
Restructuring Support Agreement with the Consenting Subrogation Claimholders at 3, In re PG&E, 603 B.R. 
471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-30088). 
 138 Objection of Governor Gavin Newsom to Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 363(B) and 105(A) 
and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004 and 9019 For Entry of an Order (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Enter into 
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By intervening in bankruptcy court, Governor Newsom protected the fire 
survivors and bolstered their bargaining power. Governor Newsom then 
reiterated the goals that AB1054 had created for the bankruptcy, which would 
require PG&E to implement a Chapter 11 plan that improved safety and 
reliability, paid fire victims in full, protected California’s climate goals, and 
would not fund the plan with higher rates for ratepayers.139 He also reminded the 
company that it had until June 30 to confirm a plan and that he would step in if 
the company failed to meet the State’s goals: 
The seemingly incessant litigation and stalling tactics undertaken by 
the financial stakeholders in these chapter 11 cases—often at the 
expense of involuntary creditors (e.g. the wildfire victims)—inspires 
little confidence that they can achieve resolution of these cases on a 
schedule and in a manner that meets the expectations of California. In 
the event they cannot or will not do so, the state of California will 
present its own plan for resolution of these cases.140 
In making this objection, Governor Newsom hired one of the leading bankruptcy 
law firms to represent him, signaling that he had the legal resources to propose 
his own plan of reorganization. Governor Newsom also wrote a letter to Judge 
Montali thanking him for forcing the parties into mediation, further reinforcing 
that the State was a key stakeholder in setting the terms of the bankruptcy.141 
Both PG&E and its bondholders appeared to recognize this, as they collectively 
spent millions lobbying the legislature to curry favor in Sacramento.142 
Following the Governor’s intervention, PG&E reached a deal with wildfire 
victims to pay them the same $13.5 billion that the bondholders had promised, 
but this did not cause Governor Newsom to reduce his involvement in shaping 
the outcome of the case and he would go on to force PG&E to make additional 
 
Restructuring Support Agreement with the Consenting Subrogation Claimholders, (II) Approving the Terms of 
Settlement with such Consenting Subrogation Claimholders, Including the Allowed Subrogation Claim Amount, 
and (III) Granting Related Relief at 2, In re PG&E, 603 B.R. 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-30088) 
[hereinafter Newsom Rejection]. 
 139 See Newsom Rejection, supra note 138, at 3. 
 140 Newsom Rejection, supra note 138, at 4.  
 141 Letter from Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, to Hon. Dennis Montali, United States Bankruptcy 
Court, Northern District of California (Nov. 1, 2019) (available at https://restructuring.primeclerk.com/pge/ 
Home-DownloadPDF?id1=MzA0OTAw&id2=0).  
 142 Lee Fang, PG&E Spent Millions on Lobbying Following Bankruptcy, Wining and Dining Lawmakers 
Who Sponsored Bailout, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 4, 2019, 11:56 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/11/04/pge-
bailout-bankruptcy-lobbying/; see also Colby Bermel @ColbyBermel, TWITTER (Feb. 3, 2020, 11:44 AM), 
https://twitter.com/ColbyBermel/status/1224418507154059264?s=20 (reporting that PG&E “spent big to press 
their bankruptcy plans with Gov. Newsom and lawmakers.” ).  
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concessions.143 The week after PG&E reached a deal with fire survivors, 
Governor Newsom wrote a five-page public letter detailing his objections to the 
debtor’s amended plan that incorporated the fire survivor settlement.144 
Governor Newsom’s demands would effectively change PG&E’s post-
bankruptcy governance structure and create an enforcement process to allow the 
State to seize the company’s operating license and transfer it to a new owner or 
a public entity in the event PG&E’s equipment caused significant fires after 
bankruptcy.145 Governor Newsom also continued to use his bargaining leverage 
in the bankruptcy process, informing Judge Montali that he was concerned that 
the plan was not yet acceptable to the State of California.146 
In the weeks to follow, Newsom would make repeated public threats to take 
over PG&E if the company could not produce a plan to his liking, leading to a 
final settlement and a plan of reorganization that Judge Montali would confirm 
in mid-June 2020.147 This plan of reorganization appeared to meet the State’s 
goals of paying the wildfire victims in full, bolstering PG&E’s solvency and 
ability to act as an insurer of last resort through the new state wildfire insurance 
fund, protecting the State’s climate goals, and preserving the credit-worthiness 
of California. Importantly, the State also would continue to have control PG&E 
with new oversight powers and a process for dismantling the company in the 
event of additional destructive wildfires.148 From PG&E’s perspective, the 
bankruptcy was a resounding success: the company’s owners and managers were 
able to keep the company together and overcome efforts by several California 
 
 143 Dale Kasler, PG&E Makes Deal to Pay California Wildfire Victims. What It Means for Utility’s Future, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 6, 2019, 11:02 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/article238138009. 
html. 
 144 Letter from Gavin Newsom, Governor of California, to William D. Johnson, Chief Exec. Off., PG&E 
Corp. (Dec. 13, 2019) (available at https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/PGECh11-
NewsomRejection.pdf).  
 145 Id. 
 146 Governor Gavin Newsom’s Reservation of Rights in Connection with Hearing to Consider Approval 
of [Proposed] Disclosure Statement for Debtors’ and Shareholder Proponents’ Joint Chapter 11 Plan of 
Reorganization at 2, In re PG&E, 603 B.R. 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 19-30088).  
 147 Colby Bermel @ColbyBermel, TWITTER (Jan. 29, 2020, 3:48 PM), https://twitter.com/ColbyBermel/ 
status/1222667766093582336 (“‘If we don’t see real progress in the next few weeks’ on PG&E’s bankruptcy 
plan, Gov. Newsom told reporters, ‘then we will be laying out the architecture for a very detailed plan for a state 
takeover.’ It’s not preferred, he said, but could be necessary.”); see News Release, PG&E, PG&E Achieves 
Bankruptcy Court Confirmation of its Plan to Reorganize (June 20, 2020), https://www.pge.com/en/about/ 
newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20200620_pge_achieves_bankruptcy_court_confirmation_of_its_plan
_of_reorganization.  
 148 Emily Hoeven @emily_hoeven, TWITTER (July 9, 2020, 12:12 PM), https://twitter.com/emily_hoeven/ 
status/1281305186699366405 (quoting Gavin Newsom: “‘None of us were shy about our condemnation of 
[PG&E]. PG&E is now out of bankruptcy, but they’re coming out a new company, with new expectations and 
accountability. And new criteria, that if they don’t perform, CA can intervene in ways we couldn’t in past.’”). 
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mayors to seize portions of their assets149 and by some members of the California 
legislature to make the company a public entity or a customer-owned 
cooperative.150 
6. Bankruptcy Law as a Force Multiplier for State Policy Goals 
In this case study, bankruptcy law provided a framework for resolving 
PG&E’s problems that supplemented the State’s existing regulatory powers. To 
be sure, the State could have implemented a similar deal outside of bankruptcy 
using the same basic framework of passing a state law with eligibility 
requirements for a new wildfire insurance fund and expanding regulatory 
capacity at CPUC. However, bankruptcy law offered important benefits that are 
both political and practical. Politically, the bankruptcy filing may have created 
a crisis atmosphere for the State government to provide a workable liability 
regime for a corporation that was publicly reviled for causing massive 
destruction. The bankruptcy filing also pushed PG&E to the top of the State 
government’s crowded policy agenda, forcing State leaders to spend more time 
considering the future of power provision in California and perhaps bringing 
 
 149 Mayor London Breed of San Francisco informed PG&E early in the bankruptcy that the city might 
offer money to buy the company’s San Francisco assets. J.D. Morris, San Francisco Mayor to PG&E: We May 
Make You an Offer, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/San-Francisco-
mayor-to-PG-E-We-may-make-you-an-13692954.php. The City later made a $2.5 billion dollar offer. Sonja 




y%20Dennis%20Herrera. This was rejected by PG&E. Michelle Wiley, PG&E Rejects San Francisco’s Offer 
to Buy the City’s Electric Grid, KQED (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/11779780/pge-rejects-san-
franciscos-offer-to-buy-the-citys-electric-grid. Mayor of San Jose teamed up with other elected officials to 
promote a plan to make PG&E a “customer-owned utility.” Nadia Lopez, San Jose Mayor’s Plan for Ratepayer 
Takeover of PG&E Won’t Be Easy, SAN JOSE SPOTLIGHT (Nov. 22, 2019), https://sanjosespotlight.com/san-jose-
mayors-plan-for-ratepayer-takeover-of-pge-wont-be-easy/.  
 150 Senator Scott Wiener of San Francisco led the effort in the State Legislature to make PG&E a state 
entity. See J.D. Morris, State Sen. Scott Wiener Gets Serious About Plan for Public Takeover of PG&E, S.F. 
CHRON. (Feb. 3, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Sen-Scott-Wiener-gets-serious-
about-plan-for-15026478.php. Interestingly, PG&E’s bankruptcy briefly became a 2020 election primary issue 
after Senator Bernie Sanders released an ad promoting a state takeover of PG&E. See J.D. Morris, Bernie 
Sanders Goes After PG&E in New California Campaign Video, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 13, 2020, 4:01 PM), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Bernie-Sanders-goes-after-PG-E-in-new-California-15051924. 
php. PG&E’s main employee union lambasted this effort, condemning Senator Sanders for what amounted to a 
“betrayal.” Id.; see also Tom Dalzell, California Wants to Take Over PG&E? Learn From Long Island’s 
Mistake, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 19, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/ 
California-wants-to-take-over-PG-E-Learn-from-15066131.php (opining that California should not publicly 
takeover the utility company). 
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Governor Newsom deeper into the fray as an advocate for fire survivors and for 
the State’s climate agenda. 
More practically, bankruptcy law provided PG&E with helpful tools that 
likely hastened its resolution of financial distress. The company faced tens of 
thousands of lawsuits from fire survivors, and bankruptcy law’s automatic stay 
reduced the cash burn associated with that litigation and allowed PG&E to settle 
the lawsuits through a bankruptcy process in front of a judge instead of Northern 
California juries. Bankruptcy law also appointed an official committee of fire 
survivors, providing PG&E with one bargaining counterparty instead of a 
dispersed group of plaintiff’s law firms representing claimants with disparate 
facts and circumstances. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, bankruptcy 
law gave Judge Montali the power to impose a settlement on all parties, 
including fire survivors, over their objections. Bankruptcy law often asks a judge 
to weigh the rights of creditors against the need to rehabilitate the debtor 
company, putting pressure on bankruptcy judges to issue orders that advance 
reorganization so long as they impose a reasonable outcome on creditors.151 This 
likely lubricated bargaining and hastened a global settlement as everyone had to 
weigh the risk that Judge Montali would impose a settlement that could 
advantage some creditors at the expense of others. 
Finally, it is not clear whether the State could have received some of the 
same concessions from PG&E outside of bankruptcy. For example, the State 
was able to influence the composition of the post-bankruptcy board, preserve 
and advance climate goals, and reshape PG&E’s internal governance. PG&E’s 
shareholders accepted a regulatory process that could allow the State to seize 
their assets if PG&E fails to meet safety goals, which is a regulatory remedy to 
which no other public utility in the United States is subject. The large privately 
owned public utilities that serve San Diego and Los Angeles were able to obtain 
access to the same wildfire insurance regime without having to give the State 
anything approaching the same level of influence over their operations as PG&E 
provided in bankruptcy to Governor Newsom and CPUC.  
 
 151 See generally Jared A. Ellias & Robert Stark, Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 CAL. L. REV. 745, 750–51 
(2020) (“bankruptcy judges balance creditor interests against other policy goals, such as the need for the firm to 
finance itself post-petition, to reorganize, and to protect the jobs of current and future employees.”); Melissa B. 
Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 
YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (noting that a bankruptcy judge must weigh interests of a speedy reorganization process 
and diminished value for creditors and going-concern of the company); Adam J. Levitin, Purdue’s Poison Pill 
and the Rule of Two: The Breakdown of Chapter 11 Checks and Balances, 100 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).  
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C. The Potential Hazards of Government Activism in Bankruptcy 
In the American system, governments have immense powers they exercise 
through well-defined processes of legislation and administrative regulation 
(whether through rulemaking or adjudication) that, ideally, provide the checks 
and balances that come from transparency and accountability. These processes 
are absent in the bankruptcy process. While government policy is intended to 
improve social welfare, it also inevitably distributes benefits and costs of policy 
measures. Taxpayers and regulated parties typically bear the cost of policy in 
regulation or legislation. As such, procedural safeguards exist in the legislative 
and rulemaking processes that give voice to the interests of affected parties and 
these stakeholders have significant opportunities to delay or veto new regulation. 
In contrast, government is subject to different constraints when executing policy 
in bankruptcy: notice and hearings before the bankruptcy judiciary and, in the 
case of the plan, majority voting by class of claims. These safeguards are 
intended to protect the financial interests of claims and interests. However, they 
may not be well enough suited to deal with policy-driven actions in bankruptcy. 
One reason is that bankruptcy is not well understood by the sort of interest 
groups that normally have a voice in the policy process. Perhaps a more 
significant reason is that the urgency caused by the debtor’s financial distress 
calls for much quicker and abbreviated processes than under administrative law 
(either rulemaking or adjudication), let alone the process of legislative 
enactment. 
Moreover, bankruptcy judges are generally not experienced in being arbiters 
of complex policy debates. To be sure, judges in business bankruptcies often 
weigh important societal issues such as the saving of jobs and of communities. 
At times, for example, they may deny relief from the stay at a cost to a 
claimholder to preserve a going concern or jobs. Bankruptcy judges have less 
experience, however, with a wide range of other types of regulatory issues. 
Judge Montali, for example, had no special expertise to critically evaluate the 
impact of PG&E’s proposed plan of reorganization on wildfire risk mitigation. 
Whether such policy making is the job of bankruptcy courts has been the 
subject of some debate, at least since the exchange between Elizabeth Warren 
and Douglas Baird in 1987. Professor (now Senator) Warren argued that a 
central function of business bankruptcy is to distribute the debtor’s losses in a 
way that promotes multiple goals, including the protection of vulnerable 
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interests such as workers, retirees, and communities.152 In her view, such 
distribution was a policy goal of bankruptcy. Citing Congressional comments in 
the debates leading to the enactment of the Code, she further recognized that 
“Congress––whether out of a crass concern about reelection or a superior view 
of the deeper social implications of business failure in a highly integrated 
society––accepted the idea that bankruptcy serves to protect interests that have 
no other protection.”153 Several other scholars have developed the view that 
judges do and should promote public welfare goals in adjudicating among the 
economic and noneconomic interests in the debtor.154 
Professor Baird has responded that distributional policies are and should be 
pursued by non-bankruptcy (“state”) law and that bankruptcy policy should be 
focused on value creation through its collective process.155 His primary concern 
is that having two different distributional systems––outside and inside 
bankruptcy––would distort incentives to file (or resist filing) for bankruptcy. 
Among his arguments, Baird suggested that promoting distributional goals is 
beyond the competence of bankruptcy courts.156 
 
 152 Warren, supra note 7, at 777 (“I see bankruptcy as an attempt to reckon with a debtor’s multiple defaults 
and to distribute the consequences among a number of different actors. Bankruptcy encompasses a number of 
competing––and sometimes conflicting––values in this distribution.”). The interests Warren had in mind were:  
many who are not technically ‘creditors’ but who have an interest in a business’ continued 
existence. Older employees who could not have been retrained for other jobs, customers who 
would have to resort to less attractive, alternative suppliers of goods and services, suppliers who 
would have lost current customers, nearby property owners who would have suffered declining 
property values, and states or municipalities that would have faced shrinking tax bases benefit 
from the reorganization’s success. 
Warren, supra note 7, at 787–88. As Congress gave bankruptcy judges substantial policymaking power, judges 
have substantial flexibility to reshape the administration of bankruptcy law. See Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. 
Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384 (2012) (examining 
the uniqueness of bankruptcy law and bankruptcy judges administering the Code); see also Melissa B. Jacoby, 
Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715 (2018) (arguing that the bankruptcy system is a model 
of “public private partnership.”). 
 153 Warren, supra note 7, at 788. 
 154 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 7, at 762 (describing the diverse moral, political, social and economic 
values that the bankruptcy process should take into account instead of focusing exclusively on collective wealth 
maximizing); Baird, Uncontested Axioms, supra note 7, at 576 (analyzing the contrast between the two 
bankruptcy views which he labels as traditionalist and proceduralists); see GROSS, supra note 7, at 1424 
(discussing the significant spillovers from the dissolution of a debtor that should lead bankruptcy to prefer 
rehabilitation and continuation). 
 155 See Baird, Forum Shopping, supra note 7, at 833–34; accord Baird, Uncontested Axioms, supra note 
7, at 580. 
 156 See Baird, Forum Shopping, supra note 7, at 51; see also Baird, Uncontested Axioms, supra note 7, at 
596 (writing that proceduralists believe “judges are poor social planners.”). 
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The phenomenon we describe in this Article broadens the debate over 
policymaking in bankruptcy significantly. Warren and Baird were debating the 
distributional policy of bankruptcy: whether the protection of vulnerable parties 
is a bankruptcy goal intended by Congress and whether the bankruptcy courts 
are equipped to implement that goal. The important shift since then is that 
government executive branches have seized the opportunity to actively use the 
bankruptcy process to promote a much broader range of policy objectives 
beyond the allocation of losses from the debtor’s financial distress. In this 
respect, an important difference exists between a court taking into account policy 
arguments advanced by private claimholders in bankruptcy, and the active role 
of the government executive in promoting its policy (or political) goals. In 
advancing the view of bankruptcy as a forum for broader policymaking, 
Professor Donald Korobkin noted that, in the case of the asbestos miner and 
product manufacturer Johns-Manville, the claimants of property damage (those 
who had installed harmful asbestos products that now needed to be removed) 
voluntarily agreed to subordinate their claims to the asbestos health victims, 
recognizing that this was the moral and politically wise things to do.157 In 
contrast, we have noted the auto workers’ benefit trust received a much larger 
payout in Chrysler than the product liability claims of purchasers because of 
political forces that motivate activism by the Democratic federal executive.158 
The cause of saving the planet from climate change––again at a cost to creditors–
–is a much more complicated and politically sensitive matter than the 
distributional goals Warren had in mind. Nevertheless, the general framing of 
the Warren-Baird debate applies: is bankruptcy the appropriate forum for 
regulation by activist government executives? As we note in this Article’s 
Introduction,159 there are related questions as to whether activism of the 
executive branch in bankruptcy is consistent with the enabling legislation and 
administrative law, and whether it is consistent with bankruptcy policy. We 
confine our discussion here to the latter question and leave the former for future 
research.160 
 
 157 Korobkin, supra note 7, at 759 (“Recognizing compelling moral and political grounds to do so, the 
property claimants subordinated their unsecured claims to the unsecured claims of asbestos health victims”). 
The property damage claimants thereby agreed to a 99% dilution of their claims. Korobkin, supra note 6, at 759. 
 158 Supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
 159 Supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 160 For an argument that bankruptcy judges should focus on bankruptcy policy goals, see Anthony J. Casey 
& Joshua C. Macey, The Hertz Maneuver (and the Limits of Bankruptcy Law), 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE *1 
(2020); Anthony J. Casey, Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose of Corporate Bankruptcy, 
120 COLUM. L. REV. 1709 (2020) 
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The Indiana State Police Pension Trust, the Indiana State Teachers 
Retirement Fund, and other pension fund investors in Chrysler’s first-lien bonds 
did not think that the bankruptcy court adequately protected their investments 
from government policy action in favor of workers or fuel efficiency. The 
judicially approved section 363(b) sale allowed the retiree health benefits 
unsecured claim to recover 44% of its amount while the first-lien claims only 
received 29%. They were forced to compromise because they were outvoted by 
institutional investors in the same first-lien debt whom they felt had been 
coopted by the federal government. Moreover, bankruptcy may have facilitated 
partisan––rather than benign––policymaking. The Democratic Party has 
traditionally aligned itself with labor unions, supporting political causes like 
minimum wage standards and mandatory healthcare benefits. The UAW is one 
of the largest labor unions in the United States and has long-standing ties with 
the Democratic Party. In fact, the UAW had refused to negotiate with the Bush 
Administration for this very reason, betting that the more labor-friendly 
incoming Obama Administration would offer better terms.161 
In the PG&E case, the sheer number of policy proposals that the State sought 
to protect in bankruptcy crowded out a policy that bankruptcy law cares a lot 
about, which is ensuring that the reorganized firm is unlikely to file for another 
Chapter 11 case. Traditionally, companies exit bankruptcy with less debt than 
they had coming in to ensure the firm is able to handle future financial shocks 
and invest in its business. Instead, PG&E left bankruptcy essentially having 
transformed its pre-bankruptcy tort liability into post-bankruptcy contract debt, 
as it borrowed money to pay fire survivors, leaving the firm with roughly twice 
as much contract debt as it had going in.162 That could leave the company 
vulnerable if future fires turn out to exhaust the wildfire insurance fund. It also 
means that the company did not gain access to incremental financial capacity 
which it could use to invest in, for example, hardening its grid to reduce the risk 
of future fires. While a robust debate in Sacramento over PG&E’s future may 
very well have resulted in the same outcome, it is likely that putting the question 
squarely before the State government, instead of indirectly through AB1054, 
might have led California to reach a different outcome. 
 
 161 STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S 
EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY 38 (First Mariners Books, 2010). 
 162 Jeff St. John, 4 Things PG&E Must Do to Survive and Thrive as It Exits Bankruptcy, GREENTECH 
MEDIA (July 2, 2020), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/four-hurdles-pge-must-clear-to-survive-
post-bankruptcy#:~:text=PG%26E%20will%20exit%20bankruptcy%20with,to%20cover%20its%20capital% 
20needs. 
ELLIASTRIANTIS_6.17.21 6/17/2021 2:50 PM 
2021] GOVERNMENT ACTIVISM IN BANKRUPTCY 549 
Finally, we note that the current Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Purdue 
Pharma provides another interesting instance of state activism where the federal 
government is using another lever: the settlement by the Department of Justice 
of criminal and civil liability in the bankruptcy forum.163 Notably, the 
bankruptcy judge approved the settlement.164 A key condition of the settlement 
is that the company would emerge from bankruptcy in the form of a public 
benefit corporation, a corporate trust that would be run for the public benefit.165 
This agreement bears similarity to deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements that have emerged over the past couple of decades, under which 
prosecutors grant amnesty in exchange for defendant’s agreement to pay fines 
and implement corporate reforms.166 The Purdue settlement was opposed by two 
dozen states who argued that it improperly blocked the potential sale of the 
business.167 In a letter to the Attorney General, forty-six members of Congress 
also objected the potential for, or at the least the appearance of, a conflict of 
interest between a state’s ownership interest in the public trust and its law 
enforcement obligations.168 The members of Congress also noted forcefully that 
that the provision determining the structure of the post-bankruptcy entity 
bypassed the authority of Congress: 
Never in American history have federal courts used the bankruptcy 
process to achieve this outcome. That is why there is so much 
 
 163 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Off. of Pub. Aff., Justice Department Announces Global Resolution of 
Criminal and Civil Investigations with Opioid Manufacturer Purdue Pharma and Civil Settlement with Members 
of the Sackler Family (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-global-
resolution-criminal-and-civil-investigations-opioid [hereinafter Purdue Pharma Settlement]; see Jonathan 
Randles, Purdue Gets Chapter 11 Approval of Justice Department Opioid Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 
2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/purdue-gets-chapter-11-approval-of-justice-department-opioid-
settlement-11605655666. 
 164 See Randles, supra note 163. 
 165 See Purdue Pharma Settlement, supra note 163. 
 166 Over the past couple of decades, governments have also implemented policies through “deferred 
prosecution agreements” (“DPAs”) that force firms to make governance changes. Governance requirements have 
included the appointment of monitors, board compliance committees, or independent directors. See F. Joseph 
Warin et al., 2019 Year-End Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements and Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements, GIBSON DUNN 1, 29 (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ 
2019-year-end-npa-dpa-update.pdf (noting that DPAs increased from two in 2000 to 102 in 2015). 
 167 Jan Hoffman, Purdue Pharma Tentatively Settles Thousands of Opioid Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/health/purdue-pharma-opioids-settlement.html. 
 168 The letter added that “[m]oreover, entangling government with this company may also create conflicts 
and doubts regarding the government’s ability to regulate other companies in the industry that are its suppliers, 
customers, and competitors. This apparent conflict will undermine the public’s faith in state enforcement 
activity”. Letter from Katherine Clark, Member of Congress, et al., to Hon. William Bar, U.S. Att’y Gen. 
(Nov. 10, 2020) (available at https://katherineclark.house.gov/_cache/files/2/d/2dcd9718-3c10-4b98-ad40-
782844eff102/1EF22593BD913787CB832BF8A3339A47.11.10.20-letter-to-ag-barr-on-sweetheart-provision-
in-purdue-settlement-final.pdf).  
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confusion and uncertainty about how this public benefit corporation 
will operate. No one knows the answers to simple questions like: Who 
would sit on the board of directors? Who would receive the profits 
from the sale of OxyContin? How would profits be distributed? These 
are questions of policy that must be resolved by Congress, not the 
courts. But Congress has never addressed these issues because state 
ownership of private business has never been considered an 
appropriate outcome of bankruptcy proceedings. To force the court to 
create this new bankruptcy outcome would set a dangerous 
precedent.169 
CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy law effects a very significant change in the rules impacting the 
finance, governance, and operations of firms who file. The debtor enjoys powers 
that are unavailable outside of bankruptcy that are consequential both during 
bankruptcy and after the debtor exits as a reorganized entity. In the couple of 
decades following the enactment of the Code, scholars have focused on concerns 
about the forum-shopping incentives created by those powers available uniquely 
in bankruptcy and their abuse by debtors in bankruptcy. Over the past quarter 
century, in contrast, investors have become increasingly sophisticated in 
harnessing those powers for their private benefit through strategies that have 
been termed bankruptcy activism. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
governments have moved from a defensive to activist posture in bankruptcy, to 
exploit analogous opportunities to pursue their policy and political objectives. 
The question of the appropriate scope of bankruptcy policy has been debated by 
scholars for some time, at least since the Warren-Baird debate. The activism by 
government executive branches extends this debate and calls for further 
examination of bankruptcy law in a new context: when is the executive’s use of 
the bankruptcy process a desirable tool for policymaking and when does it effect 
an end-run around the constitutional and democratic safeguards in legislative 
and regulatory lawmaking. 
 
 
 169 Id. 
